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ABSTRACT

Uday, Payuna, Ph.D., Purdue University, May 2015. System Importance Measures: A
New Approach to Resilient Systems-of-Systems. Major Professor: Karen Marais.
Resilience is the ability to withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions. While this
attribute has been the focus of research in several fields, in the case of system-of-systems
(SoSs), addressing resilience is particularly interesting and challenging. As infrastructure
SoSs, such as power, transportation, and communication networks, grow in complexity
and interconnectivity, measuring and improving the resilience of these SoSs is vital in
terms of safety and providing uninterrupted services.
The characteristics of systems-of-systems make analysis and design of resilience
challenging. However, these features also offer opportunities to make SoSs resilient using
unconventional methods. In this research, we present a new approach to the process of
resilience design. The core idea behind the proposed design process is a set of system
importance measures (SIMs) that identify systems crucial to overall resilience. Using the
results from the SIMs, we determine appropriate strategies from a list of design principles
to improve SoS resilience. The main contribution of this research is the development of
an aid to design that provides specific guidance on where and how resources need to be
targeted. Based on the needs of an SoS, decision-makers can iterate through the design
process to identify a set of practical and effective design improvements.
We use two case studies to demonstrate how the SIM-based design process can inform
decision-making in the context of SoS resilience. The first case study focuses on a naval
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warfare SoS and describes how the resilience framework can leverage existing simulation
models to support end-to-end design. We proceed through stages of the design approach
using an agent-based model (ABM) that enables us to demonstrate how simulation tools
and analytical models help determine the necessary inputs for the design process and,
subsequently, inform decision-making regarding SoS resilience.
The second case study considers the urban transportation network in Boston. This case
study focuses on interpreting the results of the resilience framework and on describing
how they can be used to guide design choices in large infrastructure networks. We use
different resilience maps to highlight the range of design-related information that can be
obtained from the framework.
Specific advantages of the SIM-based resilience design include: (1) incorporates SoSspecific features within existing risk-based design processes - the SIMs determine the
relative importance of different systems based on their impacts on SoS-level performance,
and suggestions for resilience improvement draw from design options that leverage SoSspecific characteristics, such as the ability to adapt quickly (such as add new systems or
re-task existing ones) and to provide partial recovery of performance in the aftermath of a
disruption; (2) allows rapid understanding of different areas of concern within the
SoS - the visual nature of the resilience map (a key outcome of the SIM analysis)
provides a useful way to summarize the current resilience of the SoS as well as point to
key systems of concern; and (3) provides a platform for multiple analysts and decisionmakers to study, modify, discuss and document options for SoS.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1

Background and Motivation

All systems are subject to change during their operational lifetime. Resilience is the
ability of a system, process or organization to react to, survive, and recover from adverse
changes (disruptions). By virtue of its importance, this attribute drives important design
and development decisions in systems engineering and management. The characteristics
and features that make a system resilient can also significantly affect the cost and
schedule of large development projects since resilience implementation consumes
resources and may therefore require tradeoffs in system functionality. Thus, due to the
often expensive nature of resilience, maintaining or improving performance is frequently
given priority, resulting in systems that are (partly) resilient to only a small set of
disruptions. Additionally, long-lasting systems, such as infrastructure networks (e.g.,
energy, transportation, communications), may be resilient to certain disruptions, but as
time passes after the system is fielded, changes in the operating environment may make
the networks less resilient to both old and new types of threats.
Systems-of-systems (SoSs) is a term that has gained traction over the past several years to
describe networks of independently operating heterogeneous systems that interact with
one another to provide an overall capability, which cannot be achieved by the individual
systems alone [White, 2006]. Examples of SoSs include the United States Air
Transportation System (ATS) and tactical SoSs used by the military. Figure 1.1 illustrates
a littoral combat SoS. The mission comprises aircraft carriers, littoral combat ships (LCS),
unmanned surface vehicles (USV), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and helicopters.
These systems work together to detect and neutralize enemy agents, such as ships,
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submarines, and mines. Each system performs one or more functions; collaborations
between systems enable higher-level mission capabilities.

Data$link$
Fuel-depot-

Hos#le-elements-

Merchantships-

Detect-anda:ack-

An#$submarine-unit-

Hos#leelementsAn#$mine-unit--

Surface-warfare-unit-

Detect-anda:ack-

Detect-andeliminateHos#le-elements-

Figure 1.1 Illustrative Littoral Combat SoS
Given the importance of systems-of-systems, managing SoS resilience is vital to national
security, global economies, and in many cases, public health and safety. There are many
reasons why an SoS may not be resilient: design flaws, unanticipated disruptive events,
emergent behavior of operational evolution (such as technological and software
upgrades), poor contingency planning and execution, and limitations at the organizational
level. Thus, while the resilience of SoSs depends in part on the reliability of their
constituent systems, traditional reliability and risk approaches do not provide adequate
guidance on how to achieve or manage resilience. Given the diversity and often wide
geographic distribution of SoS constituent systems, inclusion of backup systems for a
SoS is usually impractical and costly. Additionally, high levels of interdependency
between the systems imply increased risks of failures cascading throughout the SoS. At
the same time, the features (such as heterogeneity) giving rise to these hurdles also offer
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the opportunity to improve the resilience of the overarching system through
unconventional means.
To illustrate the above observations, consider, for example, a critical infrastructure SoS,
such as the national transportation network. At present, research, development, and
operation for each sector of the United States National Transportation System (NTS) is
generally conducted independently, with little consideration of multi-modal impacts,
societal and cultural influences, and network interactions [DeLaurentis et al., 2007].
Typically, resilience is addressed at a modal level: the robustness of a particular
transportation network is addressed independently of other modes of transportation.
Designers assume that the remaining transportation network is available when one part of
one mode fails. For example, when a subway line is suddenly unavailable due to some
failure or threat, the unmet demand spills onto the road network (comprising buses and
automobiles). Individual organizations that cover several modes, such as for example the
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), do plan for such disruptions to
some degree, but there is less coordination between organizations. Thus, for example if
Logan Airport closes due to weather, AMTRAK rail service cannot meet all the spillover
demand in a reasonable time. There may also be interdependencies between modes. For
example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy in 2012, while the airports in New York
were able to resume operations relatively quickly, road and rail services took longer to
provide adequate services. As a result, airline employees were unable to get to work at
the airports and airlines had to fly in technology specialists and customer service agents
from Atlanta to maintain their specific airport operations [Brown and Drew, 2012]. In
contrast, in the weeks after an earthquake in southern California (1994), although Los
Angeles road networks were critically impacted, rail services resumed relatively quickly.
In particular, the existence of a separate freight rail system in the city allowed officials to
augment the commuter rail services by using the cargo line during this period [Giuliano
and Golob, 1998].
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As systems continue to grow in scale and complexity, several research efforts have
focused on developing methods for engineering resilient systems. For example,
Engineered Resilient Systems was identified as a strategic investment priority by the
United States Department of Defense as part of its program objectives for 2013-2017
[DoD, 2011]. Also, the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) has a
dedicated working group for Resilient Systems that shapes research on the use of systems
engineering practices to achieve resilience [INCOSE, 2000]. The Resilience Alliance
[2001] is another research organization that facilitates research in the scientific
community with the specific aim of improving resilience in socio-ecological systems.
The interest in resilience has led to significant developments in studies and models, but
our review of the literature reveals that the research on SoS resilience is still in its nascent
stages in terms of defining, measuring, and identifying methodologies to achieve
resilience.
Resilience management is a process that allows decision-makers to systematically
evaluate, improve, and maintain resilience. Contrary to risk management which asks
“what could make the lights go out?” resilience management shifts focus to “it does not
matter what makes the lights go out, how are we going to deal with it if they do?”
[Dalziell and McManus, 2004]. Specific questions that need to be answered to manage
resilience in SoSs can be grouped into three key focus areas (see Figure 1.2):
1. What is resilience in the context of an SoS and when is it appropriate?
•

How can resilience be distinguished from other system-level attributes?

2. How can resilience be designed?
•

What level of resilience is desirable and how resilient is the SoS currently?

•

What principles can be applied to achieve resilience in SoS design?

3. How can resilience be maintained over the SoS lifetime?
•

When does resilience change?

•

How can adverse impacts of changing resilience be observed and mitigated?
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The answers to these questions lie in a wide range of fields, reflecting the diverse and
complex nature of SoSs. While a comprehensive treatment of the topic should address the
three questions, it would be ambitious and impossible to address all three questions
adequately in a single thesis. Instead, here, we focus on the first two questions and
present a new approach to aid the design of resilient SoSs. We now provide a brief
overview of systems-of-systems and conclude the chapter with specific contributions of
this thesis.

How%can%resilience%be%designed?%

When%is%resilience%
appropriate?%

•

Create%
resilience%

When%is%resilience%suitable%
compared%to%other%system7level%
a9ributes?%

How%can%resilience%
be%maintained?%

Evaluate%
resilience%

How%can%resilience%be%measured?%%
When%is%the%SoS%resilient%enough?%%
How%can%resilience%be%created?%%
When%are%speciﬁc%resilience%
improvement%strategies%suitable?%%
• Where%(in%the%SoS)%should%these%
strategies%be%incorporated?%%
• What%are%the%tradeoﬀs%associated%
with%these%strategies?%
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

When%does%resilience%change?%
How%can%changing%resilience%be%
tracked?%
How%can%resilience%be%stopped%
from%from%declining?%%

Figure 1.2 Key aspects of resilience management

1.2

Systems-of-Systems: A Brief Overview

In this section, we provide a brief overview of systems-of-systems (SoSs). The interested
reader is referred to Crossley [2004], Abbot [2006], Dahmann and Baldwin [2008], DoD
[2008], Jamshidi [2008], Gorod and Sauser [2008], Luzeaux [2011], Barot et al. [2013],
and TTCP [2014] for a broader discussion of SoSs.
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The emergence of complex systems over the past few decades has led to increased
interest in exploring methods to incorporate inherent resilience within them. A complex
system can be defined as “ an open system with continually cooperating and competing
elements – a system that continually evolves and changes according to its own condition
and external environment” (White, 2006). Examples of complex systems include
satellites, aircraft, and submarines. These systems are expensive to design and build, they
operate in harsh or remote environments, and any failure of these systems is typically a
high publicity event. In some cases, such as satellites, maintenance and repair is difficult
or impossible in physically inaccessible environments.
In recent years, networks of complex systems, known as system-of-systems (SoS), have
garnered increased attention [DeLaurentis et al, 2011; McCarter and White, 2007].
Formally, the term system-of-systems is used to denote networks that are formed from
the integration of independently operating complex systems that interact with one another
to provide an overall capability, which cannot be achieved by the individual systems
alone [White, 2006]. Examples of SoSs include the national air space (NAS) and the
United States military’s ballistic missile defense system. These meta-systems are
characterized by the operational and managerial independence of the constituent systems,
the evolutionary nature and emergent behavior of the larger SoS, and the geographic
distribution of the sub-systems [Maier, 1998]. High levels of interdependency add to the
overall complexity of the SoS.
These large-scale meta-systems exist within a spectrum that contains ad-hoc, short-lived
SoSs on one end, and long-lasting, continually evolving SoSs on the other end [Jamshidi,
2008]. Two examples within the engineering domain further illustrate this idea. Military
operations where combinations of various air, ground, and naval units collaborate to
perform a particular mission fall into the former portion of this continuum. On the other
hand, large-scale transportation networks, such as the NAS or even the national highway
system (NHS), have been established to provide services for many decades, and are
always in a state of continual improvement, and in several cases, deterioration.
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The primary driver behind the SoS perspective was the need to obtain higher-level
capabilities and performance than would be possible with a traditional systems view. The
SoS outlook presents a high-level viewpoint and explains the interactions between each
of the independent systems. Hence, while SoS engineering has its roots in the established
systems engineering discipline, addressing the needs and design of SoSs goes beyond
traditional systems engineering in a number of ways, as shown in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1 Differences between traditional systems engineering (SE) and system-ofsystems engineering (SoSE) (Adapted from Duffy et al. [2008])
SE perspective

SoSE perspective

Scope

•
•

Project/product
Autonomous/we-bounded

•
•

Enterprise/capability
Interdependent

Objective

•
•

Enable fulfillment of requirements
Structured project process

•
•

Enable evolving capability
Guide integrated portfolio

Time frame

•
•

System lifecycle
Discrete beginning and end

•
•

Multiple, interacting system
lifecycles
Amorphous beginning

Organization

•

Unified and authoritative

•

Collaborative network

Development

•

Design follows requirements

•

Design is likely legacy-constrained

Verification

•
•

System in network context
One time, final event

•
•

Ensemble as a whole
Continuous, iterative

Interest in analyzing, designing, and improving attributes such as performance and
robustness of SoS has spurred research in these characteristics. For example, SoS-related
challenges are the focus of research in various domains such as manufacturing, aerospace,
military, service industries, and environmental systems [Crossley 2004; Lopez 2006;
Wojcik and Hoffman, 2006]. Some of these challenges include acquiring systems for the
SoS, managing the interfaces between the heterogeneous systems, understanding adaptive
and emergent behavior of the composite systems, accounting for a diversity in the
management and stakeholders associated with different parts of the SoS, and considering
the staggered inclusion and exclusion of systems in the overarching system over time. In
this thesis we focus on the resilience of SoSs and present an approach to designing
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resilient SoSs. Next, we highlight some of the challenges and opportunities for resilience
design in SoSs.
Typically, the systems in an SoS are individually acquired and integrated into the larger
structure. Also, the design and development of these systems are generally independent
of each other. For instance, although almost every military system is operated as part of a
system-of-systems, most of these systems are optimized sequentially (i.e., the new system
must fit well in the existing context) [Jamshidi, 2008], rather than holistically (i.e., how
should new, existing, and possible future systems be combined to maximize desired SoS
attributes (e.g., Mane et al. [2007]). In unfortunate cases, this insular systems
development practice can lead to failures and undesired emergent behavior of the overall
SoS, as shown in the earlier Hurricane Sandy example.
Interfaces are critical areas of concern for SoS development. Apart from impacting the
seamless integration of different systems, a direct consequence of interfaces is the
creation of interdependencies between the constituent systems. Further, as SoSs
themselves evolve into even more complex networks, the links between SoSs (e.g.,
between communications and energy networks) are gaining increased attention [Thissen
and Herder, 2008; Zio and Ferrario, 2013].
From an organizational standpoint, the wide range of owners, managers, and stakeholders
of the systems constituting the SoS increases uncertainty and complexity. For example,
the global air transportation system (ATS) architecture is driven by the goals of regional
and global economies. It comprises multiple stakeholders such as regulatory authorities,
aircraft manufacturers, air traffic control, airlines, airports, and the flying public. Each
one is concerned with maximizing its own objectives. Air traffic control is concerned
with flight safety and maximizing throughput, the airlines are concerned with maximizing
profits, airports are concerned with conserving costs while providing acceptable service,
and the passengers are interested in getting the best value (low fares, minimum delay, and
good customer service) from the ATS.
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Finally, SoSs are typically never fully formed or complete [Abbot, 2006]. Their
development is evolutionary and adaptive as components, functions, and goals, are added,
removed, and modified over time. For example, while NextGen aims at transforming
(through upgrades and new technology) the United States airspace to achieve better
operational and environmental efficiency, several critical legacy systems will still be part
of the overall system. This implies that key SoS characteristics, such as performance and
resilience, must be constantly reviewed as the systems and their operating environments
change with time.
Based on the type of central control and organizational hierarchy of the constituent
systems, SoSs can be classified as directed, virtual, collaborative, or acknowledged
[Maier, 1998; Dahmann and Baldwin, 2008; DeLaurentis et al, 2011]. Directed SoSs (e.g.,
Integrated Air Defense) are centrally managed to fulfill specific purposes. The
component systems maintain an ability to operate independently, but their normal
operational mode is subordinated to the central managed purpose. On the other hand,
virtual SoSs (e.g., the World Wide Web) lack a central management authority and a
centrally agreed-upon purpose for the system-of-systems. Large-scale behavior emerges,
and may be desirable, but this type of SoS must rely on relatively invisible mechanisms
to maintain it. In collaborative SoSs (e.g., the Internet), the component systems interact
more or less voluntarily to fulfill agreed upon central purposes. Finally, acknowledged
SoSs (e.g., Ballistic Missile Defense System) have recognized objectives, a designated
manager, and resources. However, the constituent systems retain their independent
ownership, objectives, funding, development, and sustainment approaches. This
difference in central control architecture impacts the interfaces between the constituent
systems as well as the interactions experienced at the system boundaries, resulting in
implications for the design and optimization of key attributes such as resilience [Barot et
al., 2013].
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1.3

Terminology

This section defines various terms that will be referred to in this thesis.
Resilience. The ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and
recover rapidly from disruptions [PPD, 2013].
Resilience management. The process of evaluating, improving, and ultimately
maintaining resilience at an acceptable level throughout the lifetime of an SoS.
Disruption. An event that can interrupt some activity or process (of the SoS).
Restoration. A strategy to return to nominal SoS performance level after a disruption
(through the repair or replacement of the disrupted entities).
Mitigation/Recovery. A strategy to reduce the impact of a disruption.

1.4

Thesis Outline and Contributions

In this thesis, we focus on the first two questions that drive resilience management (see
Section 1.1) and present a new approach to guide the design of resilient SoSs:
1. What is resilience in the context of an SoS and when is it appropriate?
•

How can resilience be distinguished from other system-level attributes?

2. How can resilience be designed?
•

What level of resilience is desirable and how resilient is the SoS currently?

•

What principles can be applied to achieve resilience in SoS design?

Chapter 1 has introduced the concept of resilience and its importance with respect to
systems-of-systems.
The purpose of Chapter 2 is to answer the first question: when is resilience appropriate
(compared to other system attributes) in the context of SoSs? The research follows a
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review of the concept of resilience as discussed in various fields of investigations, and a
comparison with related engineering attributes such as reliability, robustness, and
flexibility. It is seen that characterizing the purpose of the different attributes is useful in
enriching SoS design in specific ways.
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the second question in resilience management: how can SoS
resilience be designed? In Chapter 3 we review and integrate the progress on addressing
this question. Methods, tools, and processes that can be applied to designing resilient
SoSs are categorized and discussed. We observe that traditional risk and reliability tools
have use in assessing resilience but that their application has limitations. Instead recent
multi-disciplinary research that has made significant strides in modeling and evaluating
SoSs can be leveraged more effectively to address this issue. Based on this review, we
conclude that a key gap in addressing SoS resilience is in providing informative design
guidance. Additionally, a major outcome of this chapter is the synthesis of a set of design
principles that be applied to the design of resilient SoSs.
Chapter 4 presents a new approach to resilience design. The core idea behind the
proposed design process is a set of system importance measures (SIMs) that identify
systems crucial to overall resilience. Using the results from the SIM analysis, we
determine appropriate strategies from a list of design principles to improve SoS resilience.
The main contribution of this research is the development of an aid to design that
provides specific guidance on where and how resources need to be targeted. Based on the
specific needs of an SoS, decision-makers can iterate through the design process to
identify a set of practical and effective design improvements.
Chapter 5 demonstrates the applicability of the SIM-aided design approach through two
case studies: a naval warfare SoS and an urban transportation SoS. Each case study draws
attention to different aspects of the resilience design. In the naval warfare case study, we
illustrate how the design process can leverage existing simulation tools and analytical
models to support end-to-end design. The urban transportation case study instead focuses
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on interpreting the results of the design process and on describing how they can be used
to guide design choices in large infrastructure networks.
Chapter 6 summarizes the contributions of this research and provides suggestions for
future work. This chapter also highlights key challenges in designing SoS resilience and
presents a series of research needs that can provide direction to research endeavors in this
field.
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CHAPTER 2. DEFINING RESILIENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN SoS

The purpose of this chapter is to understand and clearly define resilience in the context of
a system-of-systems. First, we review the concept of resilience as discussed in various
fields. Next, we make the case of resilience in SoSs by contrasting it with related
engineering attributes, such as robustness, survivability, reliability, flexibility, pliability,
agility, and safety.
2.1

A Multi-Disciplinary Review of Resilience

There is a growing body of research on resilience in a diverse set of fields, such as
ecology, economics, organizational science, and engineering. While the specific
definition of resilience varies between domains, intrinsic to the notion of resilience is the
ability to respond to and quickly recover from catastrophic events. This section briefly
discusses how resilience is viewed in various fields. The interested reader is referred to
Francis and Bekera [2014] for a comprehensive review of resilience definitions in
different disciplines.
While the concept of resilience has been applied in a variety of diverse domains, there is
little consensus on the origins of the concept: some scholars claim that the construct of
resilience began in physics [Van der Leeuw and Leygonie, 2000], others contend that its
popularity stemmed from its discussion in child psychology [Kantur and Iseri-Say, 2012],
and yet others claim that Holling’s [1973] seminal work in ecology led to the term
gaining currency. In physics, resilience describes the physical property of a material that
characterizes its resistance to shocks [Manyena, 2006]. Research in psychology and
ecology adopted a similar interpretation of resilience; here, the term emphasizes the
capacity to resist disruptions or to return to equilibrium after perturbations. For example,
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in psychology, studies on the children of schizophrenic parents [Garmezy, 1970] and on
children in the island of Kauai–Hawaii [Werner and Smith, 1977], suggest that resilience,
as a personality trait, was the key contributing factor behind the survival of adversely
affected children. These ideas were extended to the larger society in that individuals and
families are said to “demonstrate resilience when they draw on inner strengths, skills, and
supports to keep adversity from derailing their lives” [Johnson and Wiechelt, 2004]. In
general, most researchers agree that psychological resilience refers to successful
adaptation despite risk and adversity [Masten, 1994], or unexpected achievement in spite
of stress [Bartelt, 1994].
In the ecology literature, the term resilience has grown to describe two views [Holling,
1996]. The first definition focuses on the ability of a system to maintain a fixed
equilibrium point. Here, resistance to a disturbance and the rate of return to the
equilibrium point are used to measure the resilience of the system. In contrast, the second
definition moves away from this traditional homeostatic approach and concentrates on
the ability of a system to move into a different equilibrium or stable state to maintain
functionality in the face of a disruption [Holling, 1973]. While the first perspective has
provided the foundations for the development of economic and engineering resilience, the
second view is largely observed in the ecological sciences. We believe that this second
definition of resilience will have greater implications in the engineering domain as
systems grow in complexity and scale (this idea is discussed further in Section 6.2.2).
The concept of resilience has also been widely discussed in the disaster management
literature. Wildavsky [1991] defines resilience as “the capacity to cope with unanticipated
dangers after they have become manifest”. This definition concentrates on those events
that cannot be anticipated and on the post-event state, whereas resilience is also relevant
when there is a certain level of anticipation and preparedness at the pre-event state. Thus,
the term refers to the capacity to adjust to foreseen disruptions as well as to adapt to
unpredictable, sudden, shocks [Tierney, 2003].
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In organizational studies, resilience has been defined as the ability of an organization to
“keep, or recover quickly to, a stable state, allowing it to continue operations during and
after a major mishap or in the presence of continuous significant stresses” [Wreathall,
2006]. Hamel and Valikangas [2003] state that revolution, renewal and resilience are
three important states of turbulent times and that resilience is related to the constant
reconstruction of organizational values, processes and behavior. It is interesting to note
that, in addition to disasters that are one-time disturbances with severe consequences,
daily operations of rapidly changing business environments also require resilience for
survival. Mallak [1998] states that resilience is not just required under sudden shocks
such as natural disasters or terrorist attacks, but also relevant for employees faced with
continuous transformation of business environments. Some scholars [Sheffi, 2007; Weick
et al., 1999] also argue that resilient investments can be turned into competitive
advantage. As Folke [2006] states, “disturbance has the potential to create opportunity for
doing new things, for innovation, and for development”. In line with the same reasoning,
Lengnick-Hall and Beck [2003] define resilience as more than bouncing back—it is also
about turning challenges into opportunities and thereby creating superior performance
than before. This proactive notion of resilience challenges the single-equilibrium
orthodoxy and further highlights the potential of systems to transition to new, less
vulnerable steady states.
In the engineering domain, resilience is still a relatively new concept, and several
definitions have been put forward to define this system characteristic. In Hollnagel et al.
[2006], an early collection of work on resilience in the engineering domain, resilience is
defined as the “ability of a system or organization to react to and recover from
disturbances at an early stage with minimal effect on its dynamic stability”. Another
closely related definition, given by INCOSE’s Resilient Systems Working Group, states
that resilience is the “capability of a system with specific characteristics before, during
and after a disruption to absorb the disruption, recover to an acceptable level of
performance, and sustain that level for an acceptable period of time” [INCOSE, 2000].
Resilience engineering has its roots in the well-established fields of reliability and safety
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management. The idea of a resilient system builds upon foundational concepts in both
these fields and applies them to modern-day complex systems. Today, resilience has
taken on a broader scope than previous definitions: in engineered systems it involves a
wide range of potential threats and system responses, both preemptive and post event
[Jackson and Ferris, 2013].
In recent years, resilience in the cyber domain has received growing attention. As stated
by Goodyear et al. [2010], “threats to cyberspace pose one of the most serious economic
and national security challenges of the 21st century for the United States and our allies”.
Large-scale socio-technical systems, such as electrical grids and even manufacturing
supply chains, are increasingly supported by complex software. While this reliance on
cyber infrastructure reflects the need to improve efficiencies and lower costs, risks from
cyber intrusions and targeted cyber attacks have important implications for critical
civilian and military infrastructures [Chittister and Haimes, 2011]. These concerns have
prompted research efforts on resilience in several fields, such as, smart-grid operations
[Pearson, 2011], wireless data networks [Yue, 2003], and military operations [Goldman
et al., 2011].
In summary, if resilience is to inform design and policy decisions, there is a need to
address fundamental questions that continue to blur the concept. Specifically, to enhance
resilience in any field it is necessary to have a good understanding of what resilience is,
what its determinants are [Klein et al., 1998], and how it can be measured, maintained
and improved [Klein et al., 2003].
2.2

Resilience and Related System-Level Attributes

Resilience is one member of an expanding family of system-level attributes. This section
reviews the attributes that are closely related to resilience such as survivability, reliability,
robustness, and safety. We present the fundamental idea behind each system attribute and
compare it with resilience. We also provide illustrative examples to show that making
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these distinctions has value in that it adds to the richness of overall SoS design and
development.
There are many different ways to distinguish between these system-level attributes, or
“ilities”. For example, Chalupnik et al. [2013] define these attributes based on the design
changes required (or not) for a product or process to respond to off-nominal conditions.
Here, we take a system requirements perspective and apply it to different levels in the
SoS. This approach allows us to focus on the implications of each attribute for
engineering decision-making. All the characteristics discussed here deal with the idea of
a system having to cope with or adjust to some kind of change, after it has been fielded.
This change can be either: external, for instance, disruptions due to operating
environment threats, changing policies, and global economics, or internal, for instance,
component and link failures. In some cases, the differences between the definitions are
explicit, while in others the differences are subtler. We classify the attributes on the basis
of the impact the change has on the system requirements, as shown in Figure 2.1. In some
situations, systems are expected to meet their original requirements in the face of a
disruption. Qualities that attempt to satisfy these constant system requirements during the
disturbance include resilience, robustness, reliability, and survivability. In other cases, the
system goals and requirements themselves vary in order to maintain functionality during
and after perturbations. Attributes that allow a system to satisfy new or variable
requirements include flexibility, agility, and pliability. We do not consider these
attributes further here, the interested reader is referred to Saleh et al. [2009] and Ryan et
al. [2013] for reviews of flexibility; Mekdeci et al. [2012] discuss pliability; and Dove
[2001] and Albert and Hayes [2003] discuss agility.
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Figure 2.1 Classification of attributes based on system requirements

2.2.1

Defining Resilience

In the engineering domain, several definitions have been put forward to describe
resilience. For instance, in Hollnagel et al. [2006], an early collection of work on
resilience, resilience is defined as the “ability of a system or organization to react to and
recover from disturbances at an early stage with minimal effect on its dynamic stability”.
More recently, the Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-21) on Critical Infrastructure
Security and Resilience states “resilience means the ability to prepare for and adapt to
changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions” [PPD, 2013].
See also [INCOSE, 2000], Laprie [2008], Jackson [2010], and Ruault et al. [2012] for
similar definitions.
Resilience is usually represented as a combination of survivability and recoverability, as
shown in Figure 2.21. This notional representation is widely used in the literature to
11

Several definitions for resilience have been proposed in the literature. Some authors view resilience as a superset of two

attributes: surviving the disruption and then recovering from it. Others consider survivability to be the overarching attribute. For
example, according to Richards et al. [2009], survivability (a property that has emerged from the development of military systems and
describes the ability of systems to minimize the impact of finite-duration disturbances on value delivery) consists of three aspects:
Type I survivability deals with reducing the likelihood or magnitude of a disturbance; Type II minimizes performance (value) loss in
the immediate aftermath of a disturbance; and finally Type III survivability enables the recovery of value delivery in a defined period
of time.
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depict the fundamental ideas behind resilience (e.g., Tierney and Bruneau [2007], Castet
and Saleh [2012], and Ayyub [2014]). Resilience, in other words, is not only concerned
with reducing the likelihood of failure. It also stresses the need to recover from
unexpected disturbances in the operating environment. Essentially, resilience implies the
ability of a system to “bounce back” [Madni and Jackson, 2009] and hence, is a function
of several system properties, including component reliability, re-configurability of the
architecture, and diversity of sub-systems and components. Resilience can be divided into
two categories [Rose, 2007; Whitson and Ramirez-Marquez, 2009]: (1) “static resilience”
is related to the “ability of an entity or a system to maintain function”, or to survive,
when disrupted; while (2) “dynamic resilience” deals with recovery of the system after a
shock. We agree with this perspective wherein resilience is characterized as a
combination of survivability and recoverability, with an emphasis on the ability of
systems to rebound after a disruption.

Disruption

Performance

RESILIENCE

Nominal
Performance
Level

Surviving the
disruption

Recovering from the
disruption

Time

Figure 2.2 Notional depiction of resilience following a disruption (“resilience curve”)
An important aspect of resilience definition and characterization is performance. For
most SoSs, performance is a complex metric requiring consideration of multiple
capabilities. For example, overall performance of the air transportation SoS is some
function of, among others, flight schedules, delays, fares, and customer service. This is
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primarily due to the diversity in stakeholders and the objectives that are important to
them. The objectives for each stakeholder within the air transportation system, and
therefore the performance metrics applicable to each, can vary widely: air traffic control
is concerned with flight safety and maximizing throughput; the airlines are concerned
with maximizing profits; airports are concerned with conserving costs; while providing
acceptable service, and the passengers are interested in getting the best value (low fares,
minimum delay, and good customer service) from the ATS. Specifically, in any resilience
analysis, the choice of the performance metric needs to be documented well so that it is
clear to the decision-makers what SoS objectives are being considered (or not considered)
for resilience-related decisions. Table 2.1 lists some example SoS performance metrics
for various systems-of-systems.

Table 2.1 Example SoS performance metrics
System-of-Systems

Performance metrics

National Air Space

Average delay, throughput, passenger capacity

Space SoS

Carrier/Noise Ratio

Urban Transportation

Average delay, throughput, passenger capacity

Urban water supply

Water production capacity, water available for consumption

Military Reconnaissance Mission

Area imaged, number of targets identified

Military Combat Mission

Mission success

Resilience is highly context dependent – it depends on the structure (architecture) of the
system (which could be an SoS, an organization, a network, etc.), its operational
environment, and the disruptive event. For example:
•

Different systems are resilient to different disruptions. For instance, Chicago
O’Hare International Airport (ORD) is reasonably well equipped to handle
snowstorms, but 3 inches of snow in southern US caused Atlanta HartsfieldJackson International Airport (ATL) to shut down in early 2014 [CBS, 2014].
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•

A system could be resilient to one type of disruption but not to another type. For
example, an airport can be resilient to thunderstorms but may be vulnerable to
cyber-attacks on its security systems.

Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 highlight a couple of extreme cases of variation in the
resilience curve. Sometimes, in the aftermath of a disruption, the performance drop does
not necessarily happen steeply and suddenly. During the time between a disruptive event
and the full impact, performance usually starts to deteriorate and a more gradual decline
may be observed [Sheffi and Rice, 2005]. For example, when access to critical
automotive components was blocked during the 2002 West Coast port lockout, instead of
halting production immediately, logistical constraints meant that it took New United
Motor Manufacturing Inc. (NUMMI) four days to stop all assembly activities [Sheffi and
Rice, 2005]. Similarly, there are several different ways an SoS can recover from
disruptions. Recovery measures can include an increase in performance for some time
after a recovery to make up for lost capability (see Figure 2.3). For instance, NUMMI
used airfreight to get parts to the plants during the port lockout and then made up for
closures by running at higher-than-normal utilization to make up for lost production.
Conversely, in other cases, despite adequate recovery, disruptions can have long-term
impacts on SoSs (see Figure 2.4). For example, the network of small-scale shoe factories
in Kobe, Japan, lost 90% of its business in the wake of the 1995 earthquake as buyers
shifted to other Asian factories, and most buyers never came back [Sheffi and Rice, 2005].
Another example of long-term impact is the increased costs of computer hard drives
through 2013, after the 2011 floods in Thailand (second largest computer hard drive
supplier in the world) [WEC, 2013].
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Figure 2.3 Recovery measures can result in a temporary increase in performance
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Figure 2.4 Disruptions can result in long-term impacts on performance
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Returning to resilience characterization, one way to represent resilience qualitatively is
shown in Figure 2.5. A highly resilient SoS is one that experiences a small drop in
performance (high survivability) and recoups quickly (high recoverability) after a
disruptive event, as shown in the top right hand corner. Conversely, an SoS with low
resilience is one that incurs a large performance drop (low survivability) and takes a long
time to recover (low recoverability), as indicated in the bottom left hand corner of the
figure. For example, as mentioned previously, the National Airspace System is highly
resilient to a moderate snowstorm in Chicago (the airports in the region are wellequipped to maintain functionality as long as possible and to resume services quickly
once the storm passes) but exhibits low resilience to an equally powerful snowstorm in
Atlanta (currently airports in this region are less prepared to handle snowstorms with
respect to having adequate runway clearing facilities and de-icing facilities). Finally,
moderate resilience can be observed in two ways: high survivability-low recoverability or
low-survivability-high recoverability (e.g.: New York city airports had to shut down
during Hurricane Sandy but were able to recover relatively quickly compared to the road
and rail services in the city).
Next, we contrast the related system-level attributes with resilience, and discuss when
each attribute is appropriate.
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Figure 2.5. Levels of resilience

2.2.2

Reliability

Formally, reliability in the engineering domain is the ability of a system and its
components to perform required functions under stated conditions for a specified period
of time (e.g., Modarres et al. [1999], Rausand and Høyland [2004], and Madni and
Jackson [2009]). Reliability is now a mature topic in the literature and a variety of
methods exist that enable the design of reliable components and systems. However, as
systems become more complex and interdependent, understanding reliability in the
context of the resulting SoSs is not necessarily straightforward or trivial. To illustrate the
nuances of reliability and resilience implications from an SoS perspective we compare
these attributes at different levels of the air transportation system, as shown in Table 2.2.
The SoS builds upwards from lower-level components (e.g., fuel selector valves on
aircraft), to systems (e.g., aircraft), and finally to the highest-level SoS (the ATS).
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Table 2.2 Reliability and resilience considerations at different levels of SoS hierarchy
SoS element

Example

Comparison between reliability and resilience
implications

Component

Fuel selector valve

Reliability and resilience are functionally equivalent.
Classic reliability techniques are applicable and useful.

System
(simple)

Fuel pump

System
(complex)

Aircraft

The distinction between reliability and resilience is one of
degree. Designers must determine when reliability or
resilience is more appropriate. Classic reliability
techniques are applicable in specific cases of reliability
management; such as the use of FMECA in developing
suitable aircraft maintenance plans.

SoS

Air Transportation
System or ATS

Reliability and resilience are distinctly different. The
definition of SoS reliability is highly context-dependent.
Classic reliability techniques based on component
reliability must be augmented by additional tools (e.g.,
robust scheduling of airlines) when managing reliability.

At the component level, measures such as mean time to failure (MTTF, for nonrepairable components) and mean time between failure (MTBF, for repairable
components), describe in part the reliability of elements. At this level, reliability is an
important attribute that drives component design and selection. Components can be
designed to minimize the likelihood of a failure, for example by selecting better quality
parts, but once a failure occurs, by definition they do not have the inherent ability to
survive and recover from the failure. A component can be reliable, but on its own, it
cannot be resilient (since it cannot recover on its own), and no additional design guidance
can be gained by considering resilience.
The same interpretation can often be applied to simple systems. A fuel pump is reliable if
it pumps fuel at the specified rate when required to, and, if it does not pump fuel when
not required to. We can for example define a mean time between failures for the pump—
though this measure must be defined in the context of some set of possible failure levels
(e.g., the pump only provides 95% of the required pressure, vs. the pump fails
completely). The fuel pump’s reliability is a function of its components’ reliability, as
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well as its overall design (e.g., use of redundancy). A fuel pump with backup components
is designed to be reliable despite failures of its components. As with a component,
considering resilience does not provide additional design guidance.
As we consider more complex systems, the context aspect of reliability becomes more
important, and the statistical measures become harder to define and interpret. For
example, MTBF depends on what level of failure is deemed significant at the aircraft
level. So, in the case of an aircraft, we might say the aircraft is 80% reliable, if it is able
to conduct a successful flight 80% of the times it is called upon to do so, given nominal
operating conditions. An aircraft that must frequently cut missions short or operate at a
reduced level due to failures in nominal operating conditions is not reliable. Reliability
engineering techniques can be used to identify the sources of this unreliability.
While aircraft engines are designed to be highly reliable, aircraft are also designed to be
resilient to an engine failure: when an engine fails, the remaining engine(s) compensate
for the loss. The engine reliability springs from design, component selection, and a tightly
controlled maintenance program that work together to minimize the likelihood of
component failure. The aircraft’s resilience to engine failure springs from redundant
design (the remaining engines provide sufficient thrust to compensate for the loss),
protection (the engine cowling is designed to contain most failures, and the engine
mountings are designed to fail and release the engine if it presents an unbalanced load),
and training (the pilot is trained to shut down a malfunctioning engine and use the aircraft
control surfaces to compensate for asymmetric thrust).
Finally, at the SoS-level, reliability and resilience are distinct and highly contextdependent. At this level, reliability is typically some function of the performance of the
overall SoS. For instance, we would say that the air transportation network is reliable if
some majority of flights arrive and depart as scheduled under some defined set of
nominal weather conditions. This reliability is primarily driven by reliable systems
(aircraft) and by robust scheduling. On the other hand, the system is resilient if it can
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continue to deliver passengers to their destination despite rare or unexpected disruptions.
The air transportation system is not highly resilient—a large blizzard in one region can
disrupt flights around the country for several days. In contrast, some public transportation
systems demonstrate higher resilience: when a subway line is unavailable, passengers are
transported using buses
2.2.3

Robustness

The terms resilience and robustness are often used interchangeably; however, there is an
important difference between these concepts. Robustness can be thought of as the
property of a system that allows it to satisfy a fixed set of requirements, despite changes
in the environment or within the system [Saleh et al., 2009]. While the definition of
resilience involves a similar idea, the distinction between the two attributes is that while
no performance loss is allowed in the case of robustness, a resilient system may permit a
(sometimes temporary) performance loss in “bouncing back” from the adverse event
[Haimes, 2009]. Robust systems are expected to satisfy the original performance
requirements during a disruption, which may be difficult or costly. Therefore, robust
responses are appropriate for a small range of disturbances—those that occur frequently
or that can be handled robustly in a cost-efficient manner. Less frequent disturbances, or
those that are expensive to respond to without a performance loss, are better responded to
in a resilient manner. For example, passenger aircraft are expected to encounter rain and
thunderstorms quite frequently. They are therefore designed to be robust to rain, and to
fly with enough fuel to be routed around (un)expected thunderstorms encountered en
route. In contrast, extreme crosswinds occur less often, and constructing and operating
passenger aircraft capable of landing in severe crosswinds is costly. A resilient response
is therefore more appropriate. When extreme crosswinds occur, aircraft are diverted to
the nearest suitable airport for landing. The passengers and crew are safe, but not at their
intended destination, thus in this case the response is resilient, not robust.
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2.2.4

Safety

The difference between resilience and safety is quite distinct. Safety refers to the
objective of ensuring accident prevention through actions on multiple safety levers, such
as technical, organizational, or regulatory [Leveson, 1995; Leveson, 2012; Saleh et al.,
2014]. This attribute values human life (or property loss) over other performance traits.
Specifically, with respect to resilience, safety can be thought of as the aspect of
survivability that is related to minimizing loss of life (or property). In some cases, both
these attributes go hand-in-hand. For instance, in the event of a disruption to a
transportation system (e.g., a hostile attack on an airport) designers need to plan for both
safe (ensuring safety of travelers and employees) and resilient (reduce subsequent delays
that occur due to airport closure and redirection of flights to other airports) operations of
the SoS. In other cases, such as financial markets and global economies, the emphasis is
on performance recovery (e.g.: minimizing fall in stock prices due to shocks to the
system). In this case loss of human life (safety) is not a major concern. The above
transportation example highlights the role of safety when the system needs to satisfy the
same requirements it was designed for (provide transportation services with minimum
delay). Safety must also be maintained when other requirements change (though the level
of acceptable safety may change). For example, if an aircraft is retrofitted for use as a
crop duster, the design must ensure that the pilot is not exposed to the crop dusting
chemicals. Thus the retrofitted aircraft must maintain the safe air environment for the
pilot.
Safety-critical systems are systems whose “failure might endanger human life, lead to
substantial economic loss, or cause extensive environmental damage” [Knight, 2002]. For
instance, the flight management system (FMS) on aircraft is a safety-critical system as
collects and consolidates important information with respect to radio navigation,
geographical positioning, flight planning and the aircraft’s health status. Many SoSs
include safety-critical systems at various levels. For example, in addition to the FMS on
board an aircraft, the air traffic control system is another safety critical system. Because
these systems’ failure can have such negative impacts, there is an entire field of research
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and practice devoted to ensuring their safety (see, for example, Bowen and Stavridou
[1993] and Storey [1996]).
To summarize, reliability is appropriate when high frequency-low impact disruptions
(e.g., rain showers) occur and the SoS (e.g., air transportation system) is expected to
maintain functionality without any loss in performance. Robustness is suitable when high
(or medium) frequency-moderate impact events (e.g., thunderstorms) occur and the SoS
is expected to maintain functionality without any loss in performance (e.g. route aircraft
around the thunderstorm). Finally, resilience is appropriate when low frequency-high
impact disruptions (e.g., blizzards) occur and the SoS is expected to survive and recover
from the adverse event (e.g., divert aircraft to other airports).
2.3

Summary and Conclusions

As discussed earlier, an adequate treatment of SoS resilience should address the
following questions:
1. What is resilience in the context of an SoS and when is it appropriate?
•

How can resilience be distinguished from other system-level attributes?

2. How can resilience be designed?
•

What level of resilience is desirable and how resilient is the SoS currently?

•

What principles can be applied to achieve resilience in SoS design?

3. How can resilience be maintained over the SoS lifetime?
•

When does resilience change?

•

How can adverse impacts of changing resilience be observed and mitigated?

This chapter focused on the first question by (1) reviewing how resilience is viewed by
different disciplines, and (2) in the case of SoSs, in particular, identifying and
characterizing the situations in which resilience is needed. We observe that the essence of
this attribute remains constant across the different domains, but the specifics of designing
and operating resilient systems varies widely. Focusing on SoSs, we conclude that
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considering a spectrum of system-level attributes is useful to enrich overall design and
each one adds value in specific ways.
In the next chapter, we take a deeper look designing SoS resilience (the second question).
We present an overview of traditional system-level risk and reliability techniques as well
as more recent multi-disciplinary approaches that can be applied to SoS resilience.
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CHAPTER 3. DESIGNING RESILIENT SoSs: A REVIEW OF METHODS, METRICS,
AND CHALLENGES

The focus of this thesis is on supporting the design of resilient SoSs, a vital part of overall
resilience management (see ). Designing resilience in SoSs consists, on the one hand, of
evaluating resilience (measure, either quantitatively or qualitatively, the resilience of a
particular SoS), and, on the other hand, of creating resilience (determine strategies and
features, both technical and non-technical, that can be employed to improve SoS
resilience). Since resilience cannot be improved effectively without first measuring it,
both these phases are important to overall design and often times need to be analyzed
iteratively. In this chapter, we review existing approaches in the literature that can help
design resilience. First, we discuss whether and how existing reliability and risk
assessment techniques can be leveraged to address SoS resilience. Next, we consider
“newer”, more multi-disciplinary approaches that have application in the same topic.
3.1

Reliability Engineering and Risk Assessment

Reliability engineering and risk assessment both ask versions of the following four
questions [cf., Kaplan and Garrick, 1981]: (1) what can go wrong? (2) how likely is it? (3)
what are the consequences? and (4) what can be done about it? Reliability engineering
typically focuses on the ability to continue providing some pre-defined functionality
despite performance failures, and on quantifying reliability at various levels in the system.
Risk assessment considers a slightly different problem, that of operating without causing
loss of life or property. Thus in risk assessment the analysis typically begins by
attempting to identify all the ways that the system could fail. For example, in air
transportation, risks include mid-air collision, or engine failure. Once these risks have
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been identified, various approaches can be used to characterize the risks. Here we briefly
review some of the techniques used in reliability engineering and risk assessment, and
then focus on their application to designing SoS resilience. For more depth on the
techniques, the reader is referred to the many excellent texts on reliability engineering
and risk assessment (e.g., Rausand and Høyland [2004]).
Hazard identification is one of the hardest parts of risk analysis, because it is not a purely
analytical process. Instead it requires a combination of imagination and technical skill.
Many approaches to hazard identification have been proposed; most are essentially
versions of checklists, which provide the analyst with ideas on what might go wrong
[Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramianian, 1995; Dunjo et al., 2010]. Hazard
identification is difficult in complex systems because the hazards may be largely
unknown. There have been attempts to expand the range of hazards to include unknowns
(e.g., Paltrinieri et al. [2011]) and several tools have been developed for robust risk
analysis to deal with uncertainties (e.g., Ben-Haim [2012] and Cox [2012]). While SoS
specific hazard analysis tools have not been developed to date, current techniques can be
applied. For example, Robinson [1995] provides an overview of applying HAZOP
analysis to electrical power grids and transport systems; Mahnken [2001] describes the
use of case studies to identify latent design deficiencies – for instance, best practices from
the hazard identification process in the chemical industry can be used to discover flaws in
electrical power grids.
Failure modes, effects, (and criticality) analysis (FMEA/FMECA) traditionally considers
the impact of component failures on system-level risk. An FMECA analysis begins by
identifying the various failure modes of a component (e.g., valve fails open, valve fails
shut), and then determines its effects (e.g., coolant not provided), and how critical the
failure is to the system (e.g., runaway reaction). FMECAs can be similarly used to
identify potential failure modes and to investigate their impact on the overall SoS
functionality. Here, each failure is considered individually and independently from other
failures, and hence, these techniques will be most helpful for isolated failures in an SoS.
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For instance, in the air transportation network, FMECA can be used to assess the impact
of individual airport failure modes (e.g., airport closed due to terror alert, or airport
closed due to weather) on the overall SoS’s capabilities, which in turn could be used to
investigate and institute better equipment and procedures at critical airports.
A fault tree is a logic diagram that indicates how a system-level failure can be generated
by component failures. This analysis begins with an undesirable end state (failure) and
then works backwards (deductively) to find which combinations of component failures
can result in the end state. An event tree, on the other hand, is a logic diagram that allows
designers to systematically study the propagation of a basic initiating event to its
potential consequences. Event trees are almost the reverse of fault trees in that they work
forward (inductively) from an initiating event and develop a time-sequence of events to
determine which, if any, undesirable end states can be reached from the initiating event
[Rasmussen, 1975]. Although their application to (and, in particular, quantification)
complex systems is challenging (see Siu, 1994), fault and event trees can be used in SoS
resilience analysis to document how system failures can combine to decrease SoS
performance (e.g., Fleming et al. [2013]).
Because SoSs are particularly susceptible to common cause failures and partial failures,
we believe that fault and event trees do not serve well to assess probabilities of failures.
Similarly, other tools for quantifying failure probabilities, such as Bayesian-based
statistics [Clemen and Winkler, 1999], whether based on system or component level data,
are also harder to apply to complex systems and SoS involving a combination of
hardware, software, and people [Aven, 2013a]. Here, as in hazard identification, new or
complex systems are especially challenging. For example, over its lifetime, assessments
of Space Shuttle reliability ranged from 1 in 100 to 1 in 100,000 [Feynman, 1986]. When
systems must operate in a wide range of, or poorly understood, environments, risk
quantification becomes even more difficult. For example, because the risk of earthquakes
in the US Northeast was underestimated in the 1970s, nuclear power plants in the region
actually have the highest risk of seismic damage [Dedman, 2011].
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Recent research efforts have attempted to adapt some “traditional” reliability engineering
methods, such as Bayesian belief networks (BBN) and component importance measures,
to networks of complex systems. BBNs are directed acyclic graphs used to illustrate the
relationships between system failures and their causes or contributing factors. BBNs are
considered to perform better than fault trees at reliability analyses since they are not
limited to binary events and can handle partial failures. For example, Weber and Jouffe
[2006] formalize a method using Dynamic Bayesian Networks to model the reliability of
manufacturing processes. Their focus on the flows between systems highlights key
dependencies and common failure modes. This Bayesian approach can potentially be
applied to the design of interdependencies in SoSs.
Component-failure based reliability and risk techniques typically suggest using higher
reliability components or redundancy to improve system-level reliability. While some
SoS systems can be made more reliable (e.g., more reliable aircraft), the extent of
possible improvement is often limited (e.g., we can provide snow-clearing at an airport,
but during a blizzard the airport will have to shut down for safety reasons). Also, given
the heterogeneity and, often wide geographic distribution, of the constituent systems,
redundant systems in an SoS are impractical and costly. Using redundancy alone runs the
risk of overlooking other, more optimal, resilience improvement measures. Section 3.2.1
highlights some alternative techniques to creating resilience in SoSs.
Some recent research has acknowledged the limitations of the direct application of
existing reliability techniques and offered ways to expand these methods for the useful
analysis of SoS resilience [Johansson et al., 2013; Zio and Ferrario, 2013]. For example,
Zio and Ferrario [2013] apply an extension of existing reliability analysis using MonteCarlo simulations to assess the seismic risk for a nuclear power plant embedded in the
power, water, and transportation networks that support its operation.
In summary, reliability and risk-based approaches to resilience in SoS do have
application, but their use can also lead to incorrect assessments of resilience (see Table
3.1). Park et al. [2013] suggest that the lack of progress on resilience engineering in SoS
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may be “partly because quantitative design approaches consistent with principles of
resilience remain elusive, and partly because analytic approaches to resilience in
engineering have become conflated with existing approaches to analysis of risk”.

Table 3.1 SoS resilience design guidance provided by traditional reliability and risk
assessment techniques
Reliability and
Risk
Assessment
Method
FMEA/FMECA

Design questions addressed by
method (wholly or partially)

•
•

How can resilience be created?
When are specific resilience
improvement strategies suitable?

Limitations with respect to SoS
design
•

•

Fault and event
trees

•
•

How can resilience be created?
When are specific resilience
improvement strategies suitable?

•

•

•

Focus is on single component
failures and hence cannot capture
cascading failures due to
interdependencies prevalent in
SoSs
Typically deal with hardware
component failures and cannot
capture crucial software and
organizational interdependencies
inherent in SoSs
Deal with binary failures – cannot
handle partial failures as are often
times seen in SoSs
Can result in large and
complicated documentation –
making them less likely to be
useful for design guidance
Does not provide specific insight
on design improvement

Bayesian belief
networks

•

Where (in the SoS) should
resilience improvement strategies
be incorporated?

•

Depends on quality and extent of
prior beliefs (excessive optimistic
or pessimistic expectation can
distort results)

Component
importance
measures

•

Where (in the SoS) should
resilience improvement strategies
be incorporated?

•

Consider binary failures – cannot
handle partial failures
Assume system architecture is
fixed – not applicable in case of
SoSs where network is constantly
evolving

Probabilistic
risk assessment

•

How can resilience be measured?

•

•

•

Requires near-complete
identification of hazards
(disruptions)
Does not provide specific insight
on design improvement
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3.2

SoS-focused Approaches

Other than suggesting reduction of failure rates (e.g., through better components, or more
frequent maintenance), reliability and risk analysis methods do not provide guidance on
other types of mitigation strategies. As a result, in many cases, resilience is achieved
through a trial-and-error process rather than through detailed SoS-level analysis. Such adhoc approaches could result in achieving too much (unused) resilience in one part of the
network, and too little resilience in another. Also, such approaches could make an SoS
highly resilient to certain kinds of disruptions but less resilient to other threats. To design
and test for resilience across a broad range of conditions requires understanding at a
much finer-grained level how the systems will be used, the environments in which they
will be used, and the threats they can expect to encounter [Neches and Madni, 2012].
This view echoes that of researchers who raise the need for a different perspective of
resilience in the context of SoSs [Sheard and Mostahari, 2008; Madni and Jackson, 2009;
Georger et al., 2014].
This section draws on a variety of “newer” research efforts to provide a sense of how SoS
resilience can be evaluated and created. We broadly categorize these studies into a set of
three design approaches: principles, tools and models, and metrics (see Table 3.2), and
highlight how useful they are in providing specific design guidance.

Table 3.2 Design guidance provided by SoS-focused design approaches
Design Approaches

Design questions addressed by method (wholly or partially)

Design principles

•
•
•

How can resilience be created?
When are specific resilience improvement strategies suitable?
What are the tradeoffs associated with these strategies?

Simulation tools and models

•
•
•

How can resilience be created?
When are specific resilience improvement strategies suitable?
Where (in the SoS) should these strategies be incorporated?

Metrics and frameworks

•
•

How can resilience be measured?
When is the SoS resilient enough?
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3.2.1

Design Principles

A design principle, or heuristic, is an abstraction of experience that can be used to
effectively guide engineering design [cf. Maier and Rechtin, 2000]. For example, in
systems engineering, one design principle is to minimize coupling, which can, for
example, be accomplished by increasing the modularity of the design. Ensuring stable,
intermediate forms during SoS development and evolution is a principle applicable at the
SoS level (see Maier and Rechtin [2000] for a list of heuristics pertinent to architecting
SoS). Here, we present a set of ten principles to guide the design of SoS-level resilience.
Although this list is not intended to be exhaustive, we believe many resilience
improvement strategies derive from these principles. While several of the principles
outlined below are rooted in systems engineering (see Jackson and Ferris [2013] for a
recent compilation), the relevant principles have been adopted here for SoS design
guidance2. The list is organized by theme as follows: the first four principles represent
system-level design features; the next two represent network-level design features; the
following three are based on human involvement (observation, decision-making,
communication); and the last principle suggests a combination of the previous nine.
1. Physical redundancy. Employ redundant hardware (backups) to provide functionality
when primary systems in the SoS fail [Jackson and Ferris, 2013]. For example, in the
case of a public transportation network, one way to create physical redundancy is by
maintaining extra buses at city depots. In the event of a disruption (e.g., traffic jam or an
accident) these spare buses could be used on the original routes in place of the failed
primary buses, or depending on the situation, they could even be used to augment service
by running different routes.
2. Stand-in/Functional redundancy. Leverage heterogeneity in the SoS to provide
redundancy without adding additional systems [Zhang and Lin, 2010; Jackson and Ferris,
2013; Uday and Marais, 2013]. For example, loss of the LCS (see Figure 1.1) can be
2

We do not explicitly consider cyber resilience here. Though cyber resilience is increasingly becoming an integral concern for

these SoSs, principles that achieve this resilience require a different, more software-centric approach
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compensated for by using better-equipped helicopters (carrying more weapons and larger
fuel tanks) and improved unmanned surface vehicles (sophisticated surface imaging and
radar capabilities). The enhanced features on the helicopters and surface vehicles allow
these systems to be re-tasked to perform new functions in the event of an LCS
incapacitation.
3. System-level Properties. Improve system-level properties, such as flexibility,
robustness, and adaptability, of the constituent systems to achieve SoS-level resilience.
For example, flood protection (robust design) at entrances to subway stations in large
cities can prevent flooding during extreme disruptions such as hurricanes, thereby
preventing catastrophic repercussions to the rest of the transportation infrastructure
[Higgins, 2012]. Another way to improve resilience at the regional transportation level is
by enabling flexibility at the lowest service level (e.g., through the use of larger buses).
4. Repairability. Decrease total time to recovery, that is, ensure availability of adequate
resources and personnel to limit disruption impact on the primary failed system [Jackson
and Ferris, 2013]. For example, if a blizzard occurs at an airport, while closure of the
facility is inevitable, having appropriate snow removal equipment, trained personnel, and
instrumentation capabilities, can provide expedited recovery as the storm’s impact
weakens. The repairability principle can also be applied at the system level in order to
have SoS level benefits. For instance, if the primary radar at an airport fails, timely repair
of this system will ensure speedy return to full service of both terminal and en-route
operations.
5. Inter-node Interaction. Every node in the SoS should be capable of communicating,
collaborating, and coordinating with every other node [Jackson and Ferris, 2013]. For
example, in the event of a hostile attack that results in the loss of an LCS (see Figure 1.1),
other systems in the SoS, especially those that draw from or provide information to the
ship, must be immediately aware of its incapacitation. This can be achieved by improving
the communication capabilities between the systems in the SoS.
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6. Localized capacity. If a single node in the SoS is damaged or destroyed, the remaining
nodes should continue to function [Jackson and Ferris, 2013], that is, cascading failures
should be prevented or minimized. For example, if an airport closes, having alternative
airports with adequate capacity nearby will allow flights to be diverted, while minimizing
the domino effect through the rest of the airspace.
7. Human-in-the-loop. Humans should be in the loop when there is a need for “rapid
cognition” and creative option generation [Madni and Jackson, 2009]. For example, the
blackout across the Northeast in 2003 happened in part due to cascading automatic
failures: preset relays were programmed to protect individual equipment, and as each one
acted, isolating a power line or a transformer, the cascading disturbance caused a massive
blackout impacting hospitals, airports, and subways [Wald, 2013].
8. Drift correction. Pre-emptively initiate resilience measures before the disruption so
that mitigation steps may be initiated before the onset of the actual adverse event
[Jackson and Ferris, 2013]. For instance, in the aftermath of the Icelandic volcano in
2010 that had widespread impact on global aviation services, sensors are being developed
to provide warning of volcanic ash and to provide pilots with real-time information to
alter their flight paths [BBC, 2010].
9. Improved communication at organizational level. Facilitate real-time information
sharing and command and control activities between stakeholders and operators [Chang
et al., 2013]. Improved communication at the organizational level can minimize
confusion and mismanagement in the aftermath of a disruption. For example, in the event
of a terror attack at an airport, timely and effective sharing of information regarding
recovery procedures between regulatory authorities, airports, and airlines, can help
minimize performance impacts on the larger network: passengers can be evacuated safely
and re-directed to other modes of transport efficiently.
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10. Layered defence: Use a combination of the above design principles to balance
protection (disruption prevention) and resilience (surviving and recovering from a
disruption) in SoSs [Haimes et al., 2008].
Table 3.3 highlights which region of the resilience curve (survivability and recoverability)
each design principle addresses.

Table 3.3 Resilience improvement implications of design principles
Resilience Improvement
Category

Systemlevel

Design
Principles

Improve
survivability

Improve
mitigation
capability

1. Physical
redundancy

!

2. Functional
redundancy

!

3. System-level
properties

Improve/
facilitate
mitigation
accessibility

!
!

4. Repairability

Networklevel

Human
aspects

All levels

Reduce time
taken to
restore
disrupted
systems

5. Inter-node
interaction

!

6. Localized
capacity

!

7. Human-inthe-loop

!

8. Drift
correction

!

9. Improved
communication

!

10. Layered
defense

!

!

!
!

!

!
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3.2.2

Simulation Tools and Models

Improved computational capabilities in recent decades have led to the development of
high-fidelity simulations and models. These tools can aid the design process in several
ways; for example, simulations can help study failure propagation, evaluate different
recovery strategies, and identify critical nodes and links. While we can leverage existing
network theory based models to analyze links and nodes in SoSs, many of these methods
assume homogenous nodes, leading to difficulties in capturing key SoS characteristics
such as diversity and interdependencies. Given the inherent complexity of SoSs, efforts
are needed to build on these network-based models by harnessing multiple fields such as
control theory, statistical analysis, and operations research. Researchers have in recent
years begun to address these issues and here we review efforts on relevant and useful
simulation tools.
Failure Propagation. Understanding how disruptive impacts propagate is an important
element of any resilience analysis, especially in the case of SoSs where the coupling
between independent systems is not always evident. Failure propagation models are
useful to identify critical links and to assess recovery options. Such models can be used,
for example to the air transportation system to identify critical airports and to assess
recovery options (road, rail, and air) if services at these airports fail.
Most resilience-related research uses some aspect of network theory to study effects of
disruptions [Crucitti et al., 2004; Ash and Newth, 2007; Kurant and Thiran, 2007; Ulieru,
2007; Reed et al., 2009; Buldyrev et al., 2010; Sterbenz et al., 2011]. With many SoSs,
the assumption of homogenous nodes is not justified as these networks typically consist
of heterogeneous nodes (each performing different functions). A few studies have
considered nodes with the same function but different capacities [Motter and Lai, 2002;
Crucitti et al, 2004].
Instead, multi-layer networks resilience is gaining increasing attention as a better way to
represent heterogeneous networks [Castet and Saleh, 2013]. Networks can be modeled as
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multi-layers in two different ways. First, the network may consist of different physical
layers. For example, the transportation system can be modeled as a road layer, a rail layer,
and so forth. Or a network may require support from different layers. For example, the
rail network depends on the electricity network. Research in this field has led to the
introduction of interdependent network analyses to characterize the properties of such
networks [Rinaldi, 2004; Newman et al., 2005; Kurant and Thiran, 2007; Xu et al., 2011;
Ouyang, 2012; Trucco et al., 2012; Filippini and Silva, 2013]. Applying these studies to
SoSs, designers can study how a failure in one network can have repercussions in the
other and how interdependent networks can fail catastrophically after the removal of a
small fraction of nodes. These results in turn can guide resource allocation at critical
nodes. For example, in a multi-modal transportation network, impacts of disruptive
events can be avoided by co-locating certain subway and bus stations thereby providing
redundancy for the two transportation modes.
Apart from network theoretic approaches, recent research has attempted to leverage
control theory to deal with resilience of interconnected and interdependent systems (e.g.
Barabási and Albert [1999], Liu et al. [2011], and Alessandri and Filippini [2013]). For
instance, with the ultimate goal of developing resilient controllers, Alessandri and
Filippini [2013] present an initial framework that uses switching linear dynamics to cope
with nominal and off-nominal (failure) behavior of interconnected systems.
Recovery Strategies. Simulation tools can (1) allow designers to study a range of
resilience improvement options, (2) facilitate in-depth studies by allowing a large number
of parameters to be varied, and (3) usually provide some visual representation of design
implications that is vital to stakeholder communication. Most of these tools have been
developed for infrastructure networks, and can be applied to other SoSs relatively easily
[Bruneau and Reinhorn, 2004; Shinozuka et al., 2004; Miles and Chang, 2006; Zobel,
2011; Barker et al., 2013; Barker and Baroud, 2014]. For example, Shinozuka et al. [2004]
developed several restoration curves to study the return of electric power and water
supply to customers after major catastrophic events, such as earthquakes. Similarly, Miles
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and Chang [2006] developed a simulation tool that generates recovery paths for
communities in the aftermath of a disaster.
Critical Nodes and Links. Mathematical models and simulations can help designers
identify resilience-based regions of concern (critical nodes and links) within SoSs
[Garvey and Pinto, 2009; Guarniello and DeLaurentis, 2013]. Guarniello and
DeLaurentis [2013] use the Functional Dependency Network Analysis model (originally
proposed by Garvey and Pinto, 2009) to identify critical systems in SoSs and critical
dependencies between constituent systems. For instance, in the naval warfare SoS,
disruption of the LCS could lead to incapacitation of the weapons-equipped helicopter
since the LCS is now unable to transmit crucial target information to the airborne system.

3.2.3

Metrics and Frameworks

Measuring resilience is a key component of designing resilience (see Figure 1.2Error!
Reference source not found.): quantitative assessment techniques are needed to evaluate
the effectiveness of and to compare various resilience improvement designs. While
metrics and frameworks add significant value to the SoS analyst’s toolkit, developing
generalizable measurements that can be applied broadly across a wide range of different
SoSs is challenging. Additionally, given the diversity of stakeholders associated with
SoSs, difficulties arise with capturing all aspects of interest such as cost, performance,
and safety, in a resilience metric. In this section, we review various metrics and
frameworks.
Metrics. Ayyub [2014] proposes a resilience metric that is a function of the failure
profile, recovery profile, as well as the various times involved with resilience, such as
time of disruption, time during of failure, and time duration of recovery. Henry and
Ramirez-Marquez [2012] define resilience as a ratio of system recovery to the loss after a
disruption, where recovery and loss are measured as changes with respect to SoS
performance. Francis and Bekera [2014] develop a resilience factor that is a function of
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speed of recovery and the various performance levels before and after the disruption and
recovery actions. These metrics can be used to estimate the overall resilience of different
SoS designs. For example, military operators can adopt these metrics to perform analyses
of alternatives – should target identification for a mission be provided using satellites or
UAVs? And, which SoS architecture would be most resilient to known and unknown
threats? Richards [2009] presents an overall resilience metric that is a measure of the
system utlility over the design life. While useful to make an overall comparison of
different systems, such a measure provides little design guidance regarding resilience
improvement.
While there are “advantages to using a single calculated value to deﬁne resilience, it is
also important to recognize the potential issues associated with doing so” [Zobel, 2011].
In particular, an overall metric provides little, if any, information regarding specific areas
within the SoS that need attention. Also, in the context of SoSs, the uncertainties
associated with network operations, evolution, and management are quite large and hence
one metric may not be able to capture all the unknowns. To address these concerns, some
studies focus on capturing or disentangling the various dimensions of resilience. For
example, Barker et al. [2013] developed two resilience-based component importance
measures for networks. Their study quantifies the impact of a link disruption on overall
resilience, as well as the impact when a link cannot be disrupted. Han et al. [2012]
propose a conditional resilience metric using Bayesian networks to measure each
constituent system’s contribution, and subsequently to identify the most critical systems
to the overall SoS resilience. Pant et al. [2013] use an extension of the economic inputoutput model to investigate the resilience of interdependent infrastructures. They develop
two metrics: static economic resilience, which focuses on the survivability aspect of the
overall network, and dynamic economic resilience, which includes the recovery of the
network after a disruption. There have been a few attempts to modify and/or expand
existing component importance measures to analyze the resilience of networks. For
example, a recent paper (Barker et al., 2013) develops two resilience-based CIMs for
networks. Although this study does consider the resilience of the overall network, the
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analysis and subsequent metrics are only applicable to networks with homogenous nodes.
In addition, emphasis is placed on network flow (that is link resilience) rather than to
nodes. While this approach may be beneficial in addressing network resilience, it appears
to be useful only for networks where the flow between mostly similar nodes is of concern
rather than the particular functions carried out at the nodes themselves.
Frameworks. Frameworks have been the dominant trend in urban infrastructure
resilience research. For example, the Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake
Engineering Research (MCEER) at the State University of New York views resilience as
a combination of four ‘R’s: robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity, and
proposes a framework to measure each ‘R’ [Bruneau et al., 2003; Shinozuka, 2004].
Other work that has emerged from MCEER suggests a resilience index between 0 and 1
for each infrastructure network and then proposes a technique to aggregate all the indexes
for an overall resilience measure [Renschler et al., 2010]. Similar efforts at CarnegieMellon’s Software Engineering Institute have resulted in a Resiliency Engineering
Framework (REF), which posits a vector of 21 capability areas that can be used to score
the resilience of cyber services [SEI, 2009]. While most of these frameworks do consider,
to a certain degree, the stochastic (uncertain) nature of inputs, the data needed for
resilience studies are in most cases limited and incomplete. To handle these issues, AttohOkine et al. (2009) present a method to construct resilience index for urban infrastructure
using belief functions that are capable of handling imprecise and subjective information
3.3

Summary and Conclusions

Returning to the broader context of this research, the following are the main questions
that need to be addressed by any comprehensive resilience management plan:
1. What is resilience in the context of an SoS and when is it appropriate?
•

How can resilience be distinguished from other system-level attributes?

2. How can resilience be designed?
•

What level of resilience is desirable and how resilient is the SoS currently?

•

What principles can be applied to achieve resilience in SoS design?
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3. How can resilience be maintained over the SoS lifetime?
•

When does resilience change?

•

How can adverse impacts of changing resilience be observed and mitigated?

In this chapter, we began to answer the second question and discussed methods in the
literature that can be applied to addressing SoS resilience. Major limitations of the
metrics and techniques in the context of SoSs include:
•

Binary characterizations of system states: Most analyses compute network
wide impacts by assuming systems and links are either failed or operational.

•

Lack of focus on the recovery: Most studies focus on the impact of system and
link failures on network level performance metrics with little consideration of
active recovery strategies.

•

Lack of design guidance: Aggregated metrics at the network level provide little
information on how SoS design can be improved in the context of resilience.

An alternative approach to SoS resilience design that addresses these limitations is
presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4. A NEW APPROACH TO RESILIENCE DESIGN: SYSTEM
IMPORTANCE MEASURES

This chapter introduces a new approach to resilience design that is applicable to systemsof-systems. The proposed approach provides specific SoS design guidance by identifying
where in the SoS resources need to be targeted to improve the overall resilience and
determining how the improvements can be realized.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, employing a single metric to evaluate SoS
resilience provides little direct design guidance. Such a metric provides little, if any,
information regarding specific areas within the SoS that need attention or specific aspects
of the SoS’s resilience that could be improved. Also, a single metric does not provide
guidance on which SoS should be changed and how it should be changed. In this work,
we present one approach that can enable more effective and informed decision-making in
the context of SoS resilience improvement.
4.1

Component Importance Measures: Motivating the SIM Approach

At the system level, researchers have developed a set of metrics, collectively known as
Component Importance Measures, to rank constituent components based on their impact
on the system level risk and/or reliability. CIMs are well established within reliability
engineering and risk assessment [Elsayed, 1996; Van der Borst and Schoonakker, 2001;
Rausand and Høyland, 2004; Ramirez-Marquez and Coit, 2007]. Traditionally,
component importance measures have been used to identify and evaluate the impact that
disruptions at the component level have at the system level. In particular, CIMs allow
practitioners to rank components based on the order in which they impact the system.
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Typically, importance measures follow two steps: (1) quantify the effect of individual
component reliabilities (or lack thereof) on the system, and, (2) rank the components in
terms of their relative importance to system-level reliability. Table 4.1 summarizes some
commonly used component importance measures. Note that component ranking may vary
depending on the importance measure used.

Table 4.1 Component Importance Measures (CIMs)
CIM

Question answered by CIM

CIM Equation

Birnbaum
importance

What is the reliability importance of
component i?

!!! = !! − !! ! = 0

Improvement
potential

What is the improvement in system
reliability when component i is replaced by
perfect component?

!!!" = !! ! = 1 − !!

Risk Achievement
Worth (RAW)

What is the increase in risk/decrease in
reliability if component i fails?

!!!"# =

1 − !! (! = 0)
1 − !!

Risk Reduction
Worth (RRW)

What is the decrease in risk/increase in
reliability if component i is replaced by
perfect component?

!!!!" =

1 − !!
1 − !! (! = 1)

Fussell-Vesely

What is the fractional contribution of
component i to the risk/reliability?

!!!" =

Criticality
importance

What is the probability component i has
failed given system has failed, i.e.,
probability that component i has caused
system failure?

!! ! = 1 − !!
1 − !!

!!!" = !!! .

1 − !!
1 − !!

Note: SR = System reliability (baseline); SR(i=1) = System reliability when component i is replaced by perfectly
reliable version of itself; SR(i=0) = System reliability when component i fails; pi = Reliability of component i

Can component importance measures be employed as-is to study the importance of
systems in SoSs? To answer this question, we consider a few underlying assumptions of
these measures: (1) components are either failed or working, (2) the structure of the
system is fixed and does not evolve with time, and, (3) components are independent.
Reflecting on the earlier discussion on reliability and resilience, we conclude that these
measures do not capture the survivability and recoverability aspects of continually
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evolving SoSs. Additionally, component reliability can be estimated relatively easily,
while SoS resilience is a more nuanced entity that in many cases is a non-linear function
of, at the very least, two attributes: performance and time.
Our research focuses on developing importance measures specifically for systems-ofsystems that are characterized by diversity in nodes and functions. Similar to the CIMs
described above, system importance measures help identify and rank systems in an SoS
that have the most impact on different aspects of the overall resilience.
This work presents three System Importance Measures (SIMs) that rank or prioritize the
constituent systems of an SoS based on their resilience significance. We say that a system
is resilience significant if a disruption of the system contributes significantly to measures
of SoS performance. As will be explained in this chapter, these measures are an aid to
design in that they help determine “where” in the SoS resources need to be targeted so
that they provide the most benefit in the event of disruptions.
Figure 4.1 provides an overview of the SIM-based resilience design process. This
approach uses an iterative process to determine promising design choices. First, baseline
SoS resilience is evaluated using system importance measures (SIMs). The outcome of
this stage is a resilience map that indicates the relative resilience significance of systems
within the SoS. In the second stage, SoS resilience is improved using appropriate
strategies from a list of design principles. Now, the new SoS designs can be re-evaluated
using the SIMs to determine whether the chosen strategies have been effective in
addressing the concerns (significant systems) identified in the first step. Based on the
specific needs of an SoS, decision-makers can iterate between the two steps to find a set
of practical and effective design improvements.
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Resilience Map

SoS resilience curves
Disruption impacts
Mitigation strategies

System
Importance
Measures (SIM)
analysis

Design Principles

Design
changes

1. Physical redundancy
2. Functional redundancy
3. System-level properties
4. Repairability
5. Inter-node interaction
6. Localized capacity
7. Human-in-the-loop
8. Drift correction
9. Improved communication
10. Layered defense

Figure 4.1 A New Approach to SoS Resilience Design
Specifically, the resilience design process comprises four phases (see Table 4.2). The first
three phases constitute the SIM analysis where current SoS resilience is evaluated: Phase
1 – what can go wrong?; Phase 2 – what are the consequences?; and Phase 3 – what is the
current resilience of the SoS? The outcome of third phase is a resilience map that
summarizes how well or how badly the SoS currently handles disruptions. The last phase
(Phase 4) is SoS design improvement and asks: What can be done to increase resilience
of the overall SoS? The outcome of this phase is a set of design changes.

Table 4.2 Four phases in SIM-based SoS Resilience Design
Phase

Task

1

Identify potential disruptions. What can go
wrong?

2

Determine impacts of disruptions. What are the
consequences of unmitigated disruptions?

3

Determine current resilience of SoS. How well
is the current SoS able to handle the disruptive
impacts?

4

Determine design modifications to improve
resilience. What can be done to improve SoS
resilience?

Stage

SIM Analysis

Application of Design
Principles
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Classic risk-based design involves answering the following questions: What can go
wrong?; What are the consequences; and, What can be done about it? While the SIMbased resilience design process follows a similar course (see Figure 4.2), we incorporate
features within the original design process that are specific to SoSs. For instance, we
present (1) SIMs to evaluate the consequences of adverse impacts on the SoS and (2)
design principles that leverage SoS characteristics to suggest suitable design
improvements. The SIMs focus on understanding SoS-level impacts of disruptions and on
pointing to potential design improvements, and hence can subsequently be used in costbenefit analyses to determine which improvements can be implemented.

Overview'of'Risk-based'Design'
'

Speciﬁcs'of'Resilience-based'Design'
'

What(can(go(wrong?(

Iden%fy(poten%al(disrup%ons(

What(are(the(consequences?((
(and)((
How(are(they(addressed(at(present?(

Evaluate(current(SoS(resilience(
using(System(Importance(Measures(

What(can(be(done((i.e.,(what(
improvements(can(and(should(be(made)?(

Suggest(improvements(using(SoSD
focused(design(principles(

Figure 4.2 Distinguishing features of Resilience-based design within the context of Riskbased design
The purpose of the SIM-based resilience design method is to aid decision-making at the
design stage and during operations. During design, the SIMs can be used to identify
resilience gaps and possible solutions. During operations, the SIMs can be used to choose
the most appropriate response to a disruption. For example, a resilience design might
include adding both bigger buses and a backup bus. Then, during operations, the SIMs
can be used to select the most appropriate response based on the particular disruption.

52
We begin with the identification of potential disruptions, followed by an evaluation of
how well the SoS currently handles these adverse impacts, and finally determine design
changes that can improve resilience. So, while resilience is witnessed at the operational
level (how does the SoS survive and recover from disruptive impacts?), the intent of the
proposed approach is to facilitate design-related decisions, the results of which have
implications for SoS operations.
4.1.1

Simple illustrative SoS

We use an illustrative example in this chapter to highlight key outcomes of each of the
four phases (see Figure 4.3). This SoS is a much-simplified version of an urban
transportation network and has been chosen for ease of explanation. The SoS, comprising
three systems (a bus, a subway, and a ferry), enables transportation of passengers from A
to B. Thus, the overall capability of this simple SoS is the movement of people from A to
B.

Ferry
A

Subway
B
Bus
Figure 4.3 Illustrative example SoS

There are many different ways to describe SoS performance. For instance, in urban
transportation SoSs, measures of interest include average delay, frequency of service,
demand, and vehicle throughput. Also, the various modes of transportation serve different
types of passengers with different preferences. Thus, the utility of an SoS is driven by a
range of performance measures and stakeholder preferences. In addition, as shown in
Figure 4.2, it is also necessary to consider the cost of making improvements. Chapter 6
discusses some potential ways of incorporating SIMs into cost-benefit analyses.
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For ease of explanation of the resilience design process we define SoS performance of the
illustrative example as the number of passengers (passenger ridership) transported
between A and B, and we do not consider the cost of mitigations.
4.2

Identify Potential Disruptions (Phase 1)

A disruption is an event that can interrupt some activity or process. With respect to SoSs,
we define disruptions as events that adversely impact the overall SoS performance.
Instigating events cause disruptions. For example, in the case of a military operation, a
disruption is the inability of the ship to fire its own weapons due to an attack by an enemy
agent. Here, the attack on the ship is the instigating event. Another example of a
disruption is the closure of an airport, such as O’Hare International (ORD), due to some
adverse weather situation (e.g. snowstorm in Chicago). The instigating event here is the
snowstorm.
Typically a disruption definition consists of three parts (see Figure 4.4): impact of the
disruption (at the SoS-level), likelihood of the disruption, and cause (instigating event) of
the disruption. In the previous example, closure of the airport is the disruption, the storm
is the instigating event, the frequency of such closures is the likelihood, and delays and
flight cancellations are impacts.

Disrup*on&

!(e.g.,!closure!of!ORD)!

Cause&&
(ins*ga*ng&event)!
(e.g.,!snowstorm)!

Likelihood&

SoS6level&Impact&

given!snowstorm)!

cancella;ons)!

(e.g.,!likelihood!of!shutdown!

(e.g.,!ﬂight!delays!and!

Figure 4.4 Defining a single-system disruption
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Instigating events can also cause multi-system disruptions. We term these events as
common cause disruptions. For instance, a snowstorm (instigating event) in the New
York region can cause the disruption of the three major airports in the area – John F.
Kennedy International Airport (JFK), LaGuardia Airport (LGA), and Newark Liberty
International Airport (EWR) (see Figure 4.5). The SoS-level impact is the total impact of
the three airport closures. The overall likelihood of this multi-airport disruption is a
function of the three individual likelihoods given a snowstorm.
Multi-system disruptions can also occur when disruptive impacts propagate through the
SoS with systems failing in sequence (see Rinaldi et al. [2001]). These events are called
cascading disruptions.

Disrup'on*

!(e.g.,!closure!of!three!major!airports!in!New!York!region!–!JFK,!LGA,!and!EWR)!

Cause**
(ins'ga'ng*event)!
(e.g.,!snowstorm)!

Likelihood*
Likelihood!of!JFK!shutdown!
given!snowstorm!

SoS4level*Impact*
(e.g.,!ﬂight!delays!and!

cancellaHons)!

Likelihood!of!LGA!shutdown!
given!snowstorm!

Likelihood!of!EWR!shutdown!
given!snowstorm!

Figure 4.5 Defining multi-system disruptions
In this research we are primarily concerned with the impact (described in Chapters 4 and
5) and likelihood (discussed in Section 6.1.4) of disruptions. In many cases, such as
adverse weather events, decision-makers have more control over the response of the SoS
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to disruptions than over the instigating events (causes). As a result, focusing on the
impacts and likelihood of the disruptions rather than the causes may often be more useful
in terms of planning and resource allocation.
Returning to the air transportation SoS, examples of disruptions include closure of ORD
(due to a snowstorm), reduced capacity at JFK (due to unanticipated closure of a runway),
and shutdown of ATL (due to a terrorist threat). Using suitable simulation tools and
models, SoS-level impacts of these disruptions can be evaluated. Chapter 5 discusses
some of these tools.
Determining the likelihood of disruptions is relatively harder; such estimates need careful
consideration of multiple factors such as frequency of disruptive events, forecasts of
service demand, architecture of the SoS (e.g., interdependencies that can cause cascading
failures), and SoS evolution. When the potential disruptions are known a priori (e.g.,
winter blizzards in the north east US typically occur every year), historical data can be
leveraged to estimate disruption likelihoods. For example, Figure 4.6 was generated using
historical data and points to the amount of snow that leads to school closings in different
regions of the US [Barkhorn, 2014]. In the case of unanticipated disruptions, although the
causes may be hard to predict, research has shown that their likelihoods can be estimated
by leveraging subjective estimates by experts (see, for example, Okashah and Goldwater
[1994]).
In summary, while it is practically impossible to predict all adverse events or scenarios
for any SoS, a thorough analysis of disruptive impacts and mitigations can be used to
handle whole classes of potentially disruptive events.
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Figure 4.6 Amount of snow needed to close schools in the US [Barkhorn, 2014]
Vulnerability maps are useful tools to qualitatively represent the likelihood and impact of
different disruptions for a particular SoS [Sheffi and Rice, 2005]. An example is shown in
Figure 4.7. Analysts and decision-makers can place various threats in the appropriate
quadrant of the vulnerability framework. However, it must be noted that these maps are
not static – they must be continually monitored as, in time, new threats may emerge and
the positions of existing disruptive events can change. For example, cyber-attacks on
infrastructure SoSs used to be rare, but more recently the likelihood of these threats has
increased.
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Figure 4.7 Vulnerability map (showing selected disruptions) for air transportation
network in North-East Corridor

4.2.1

Outcome of Phase 1

The outcome of Phase 1 is a set of potential disruptions of the SoS. The task of
identifying potential disruptions can be carried out by a team of analysts using relevant
methods such as brainstorming in a group setting and by leveraging historical data (e.g.
age of vehicles, maintenance data, weather information, policy changes). This step is
similar to the first phase of risk identification that is carried out in risk assessment (see
Figure 4.2).
Returning to the simple illustrative SoS introduced earlier (refer Figure 4.3), we consider
three disruptions: (a) disruption of the bus, (b) disruption of the ferry, and (c) disruption
of the subway train. This set is described by eq. (1).
!"#!!"!!"#$%#&'(!!"#$%&'"()# = { !"# , !"##$ , (!"#!"#)}!

(1)
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Note that it is possible for multiple vehicles to be disrupted simultaneously. However, for
the sake of simplicity and to highlight the results of each phase in the resilience design
process we only consider single-system disruptions in this example.
In the next phase, we determine how each of these disruptions impacts the SoS.
4.3

Estimate Impacts of Disruptions (Phase 2)

To develop the system importance measures we begin by considering the desired SoS
performance, meaning, in the absence of any disruption, how should the SoS
function/operate? Figure 4.8 shows the desired (nominal) curve. From a design
perspective, this figure illustrates the desired performance level (!!"#$%&' ) that the SoS is
designed to maintain while in operation. The performance level and operational
timeframe are specific to each SoS. For example, returning to the illustrative urban
transportation SoS, typical measures of performance include passenger ridership,
frequency of service, and average delay across the network. The operational lifetime of
transportation networks is usually on the order of decades.
SoS Performance

PNominal

Time

Figure 4.8 Example of a desired (nominal) curve
In practice, !!"#$%&' in the desired curve may experience minor fluctuations as shown in
Figure 4.9. For instance, airports regularly experience changes in traffic flow due to the
prevailing winds. In such cases, we use the mean value across these fluctuations to
determine a suitable !!"#$%&' level.
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SoS Performance

PNominal

Time

Figure 4.9 Illustration of variability in !!"#$%&'
Next we investigate the impact of a particular disruption on the SoS. Figure 4.10
represents the disruption curve. When some disruption occurs, one or more systems in
the SoS are affected. In this figure we assume that a single system (System i) is disrupted
at !!"!#!$% , leading to a subsequent drop in the SoS performance level from the desired
value (!!"#$%&' ) to a lower value (!!"## ). The value stays low till the disrupted system is
repaired or replaced at !!"#$% when the SoS performance level is returned to !!"#$%&' .
For example, in an urban transportation SoS, unscheduled subway line repairs can reduce
throughput and cause delays on the rail mode, resulting in a reduction in the overall
performance of the urban transportation network. However, some residual performance
remains as existing road (buses and trams) and water (ferry) transportation modes
continue to provide service to/and from neighboring cities. Note that at this stage of the
resilience analysis, mitigation strategies, such as running extra subway trips or re-routing
buses to compensate for the performance loss, are not considered. The original nominal
performance level is restored when the repairs are complete and the subway system is
completely operational again. While in Figure 4.10 only one system, System i, is
disrupted, a similar curve can be used to depict the impact of a multi-system disruption.
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Figure 4.10 Example of a disruption curve with System i disrupted and System i restored
without mitigation actions
Note that in the aftermath of a disruption, SoSs do not necessarily experience a sharp
drop in performance or even a sharp increase in performance once the disrupted system
has been restored as depicted in Figure 4.10. In many cases, gradual decreases and
increases (see Figure 4.11) are observed. For example, consider the closure of an airport
due to a snowstorm. As the storm abates, some runways are typically cleared sooner than
others allowing partial performance increases as the entire airport is “restored” gradually.
A similar curve can be used to represent multi-system disruptions where multiple systems
are disrupted and restoration of all the disrupted system results in a return to !!"#$%&'
(see Figure 4.12).
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Figure 4.11 Disruption curve with gradual restoration of the disrupted system
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Figure 4.12 Example of a disruption curve for a multi-system disruption: System i
disrupted followed by System j disrupted, and System i restored followed by System j
restored
Also, Figure 4.10 indicates that in the absence of any mitigation measures, SoS
performance is restored to its nominal level when the original “disrupted” system is
restored (for example, by repairing or replacing it). Note that this may not always be the
case. In some instances, for example in time-constrained military missions, failed systems
are not repaired or replaced within the mission’s time frame. Instead, the mission
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continues with the available resources. In Chapter 5 we further discuss the application of
the resilience design framework to such military missions through the use of a case study.
Against this backdrop, we now present the first importance measure, System Disruption
Importance.
4.3.1

System Disruption Importance

The System Disruption Importance captures the impact of unmitigated disruptions. To
develop this measure, we follow two steps. First, we determine how much a disruption
(from the set identified in Phase 1) affects the overall SoS, and second, we determine
how important this effect is relative to other disruptions. Redrawing Figure 4.10, we
observe that the hatched region in Figure 4.13 represents the impact of an unmitigated
disruption on the overall SoS. This impact, termed !"#$%&! , can be calculated using:

!"#$%&! =

!!"#$%
!!"!#!$%

! ! − ℎ! (!)!

Here the subscript D refers to a disruption from the set identified in Phase 1.

(2)
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Figure 4.13 Disruption curve with !"#$%&! highlighted (hatched region)
The System Disruption Importance (!"#! ) determines the relative importance of an
unmitigated disruption, and is calculated using eq. (3):

!"#! =

!"#$%&!
!
Worst!case%SoS%impact

(3)

Again, here the subscript D refers a disruption from the set identified in Phase 1.
The denominator in the above equation is a measure of the worst-case impact on the SoS.
This value is domain and SoS specific and can be estimated using, among others,
historical data (e.g.: when studying the National Airspace SoS, closure of the US airspace
in the three days following the 9/11 attacks can be a measure of the worst-case disruption
impact) or simulation tools (as will be demonstrated in Chapter 5). !"#! provides an
indication of the relative importance of different unmitigated disruptions. For instance,
those disruptions with large !"#! values, i.e., those with large hatched regions, have the
greatest impact on the SoS when they occur (since no mitigation measures, other than
restoring the affected systems are considered). Thus, based on the !"#! values, a ranking
can be obtained of the relative importance of different disruptions. Note that the worst-
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case value (denominator in eq. (3)) can be changed or updated without affecting the
importance of different disruptions since all !"#! are normalized using the same worstcase value.
Partial disruptions are also possible. For example, a landing gear malfunction may
require an entire runway to be sprayed with foam for an emergency aircraft landing.
Depending on the airport, such a situation can disrupt services on one runway for several
hours while other runways are still in operation. Thus, the airport functions at a
performance level between its nominal and full disruption (e.g. blizzard) values (see
Figure 4.14).
(a)
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(b)
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(% of on-time flights in NAS)
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Figure 4.14 Notional example of full and partial disruptions: (a) impact of complete
shutdown of ORD on National Air Space (NAS) and (b) impact of a runway closure at
ORD on NAS

4.3.2

Outcome of Phase 2

The outcome of Phase 2 is a list (ranking) of the impacts of different unmitigated
disruptions. We demonstrate the process of ranking the disruptions by returning to the
simple illustrative SoS (refer to Figure 4.3). The disruption curves as well as !"#$%&!
values for the disruptions identified in Phase 1 are shown in Figure 4.15.
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Assuming a worst-case SoS impact of 110 units, we can compute !"#! for all three
disruptions using eq. (3), as shown in Table 4.3. From these values, the relative
importance of the different disruptions can be captured (third column of Table 4.3): a low
ranking (e.g.: Ferry disruption) indicates a relatively low impact on SoS performance,
while a high ranking (e.g. Subway disruption) indicates a disruption that has a large
impact on the SoS.
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Figure 4.15 Disruption curves for illustrative SoS example (numbers in bold indicate
!"#$%&! values)

Table 4.3 !"#! and importance ranking for illustrative example
Disruption (D)

System Disruption Importance (!"#! )

Importance ranking

Bus

!"#!"# = 0.27

2

Ferry

!"#!"##$ = 0.09

3

Subway

!"#!"#$%& = 0.45

1

4.4

Determine Current SoS Resilience (Phase 3)

In Phase 3, we consider mitigation measures. System-of-systems typically have some
recovery strategies and contingency plans in place to handle disruptions. The resilience
curve in Figure 4.16 provides an example of one mitigation measure: the ability of a
system, here System j, to provide partial recovery when one or more systems in the SoS
are disrupted. Given the availability of the mitigation measure that can be deployed at
time !!"#"$%#"&' , the SoS performance can be raised above !!"## to some intermediate
level (!!"#"$%#&' ) till the original system(s) that provided the capability is (are) restored.
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For example, consider an urban transportation SoS. Unscheduled line repairs on subway
tracks can reduce throughput and cause delays, resulting in a reduction in the overall
performance of the urban transportation network. However, additional bus service
between stations on the affected rail line can compensate for some of this lost
performance.
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Tinitial
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Figure 4.16 Example of a resilience curve
The mitigation path can take many different forms, depending on a variety of factors,
including SoS topology and the specific system(s) used in the recovery. For example, the
resilience curve may follow a linear path (as shown by the dashed line in Figure 4.17), a
step path (dotted line), or perhaps even a recovery path that provides increased
performance for a short duration before returning to the nominal SoS performance level
(dashed-dotted line).
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Figure 4.17 Notional resilience curves indicating different mitigation strategies
In this phase of the design approach, we evaluate the current SoS resilience and highlight
key areas where improvements are needed or where downgrades can be made. To achieve
this goal, we present the next two importance measures, System Disruption Conditional
Importance and System Disruption Mitigation Importance.

4.4.1

System Disruption Conditional Importance

Referring to the hatched area in Figure 4.18, the System Disruption Conditional
Importance (!"#$!,! ) is calculated using eq. (4) and answers the question: what is the
relative importance of a mitigated disruption?

!"#$!,! =

!!"#$%
!
!!"#$%"!&

! − !!,! (!)

Worst!case%SoS%impact

(4)

Here, as before, the subscript D refers to a disruption from the set identified in Phase 1,
and the subscript M refers to a mitigation measure that can provide partial recovery of
SoS performance when D occurs.
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There are several ways to mitigate disruptive impacts. For instance, in the aftermath of a
disruption (e.g.: flooding of a subway tunnel), a single system (e.g., one bus) or multiple
systems (e.g., multiple buses and/or increased car pooling) can be used to provide partial
recovery till the subway is restored. When considering multi-system mitigations, given
the domain-specific structure and behavior of SoSs, curves for combined recovery are not
necessarily linear combinations of the individual system recoveries. Typically, SoS
engineers would use suitable simulations and models to assess the mitigation
effectiveness of multi-system recovery (further discussed in Chapter 5).
Observe that since mitigations reduce the impact of disruptions, the hatched area in
Figure 4.18 is smaller than in the previous case (Figure 4.13). Specifically, a low
!"#$!,! shows that the impact of the disruption has been mitigated, and vice versa. Note
that when mitigation is not provided or designed !"#$!,! is undefined. We discuss in
Section 4.4.3 how the analyst can determine what value of !"#$!,! constitutes an
adequate mitigation.
f (t)
SoS Performance

hD (t)
gD,M (t)

Disruption
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Figure 4.18 Resilience curve with !"#$!,! (hatched region) and !"#!!,! (solid grey
region) highlighted
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4.4.2

System Disruption Mitigation Importance

The second importance measure, System Disruption Mitigation Importance (!"#$!,! ),
answers the question: what is the relative importance of the effectiveness of a mitigation
measure in reducing the impact of a disruption? This measure is represented by the solid
grey region in Figure 4.18 and is calculated using eq. (5):

!"#$!,! =

!!"#$%
!
!!"#$%"!& !,!

! − ℎ! (!)

(5)

Worst!case%SoS%impact

Note that, similar to !"#! and !"#$!,! , !"#$!,! is also normalized by the earlier worstcase value and is undefined when mitigation is not possible. The larger the value of
!"#$!,! , the more important the mitigation measure is to reducing the impact of the
corresponding disruption. Conversely, a low !"#$!,! indicates that the mitigation
measure does not significantly alleviate the disruption impact.
In summary, !"#! provides an assessment of the impact of unmitigated disruptions on
the SoS while !"#$!,! and !"#$!,! evaluate effectiveness of mitigation measures in
reducing these disruptive impacts (see Table 4.4).

Table 4.4 System Importance Measures
SIM

Question answered by
SIM

Meaning
Low Value

High Value

System
Disruption
Importance
(!"#! )

What is the relative
importance of an
unmitigated disruption

Disruption has low
adverse impact on SoS

Disruption has high
adverse impact on
SoS

System
Disruption
Conditional
Importance
(!"#$!,! )

What is the relative
importance of a mitigated
disruption

Disruption, given its
impact is mitigated, has
low adverse effect on
SoS

Disruption, given its
impact is mitigated,
has high adverse
effect on SoS
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SIM

System
Disruption
Mitigation
Importance
(!"#$!,! )

Meaning

Question answered by
SIM
What is the relative
importance of the
effectiveness of a mitigation
measure?

Low Value

High Value

Mitigation measure
contributes little to SoS
resilience

Mitigation measure
has high
contribution to SoS
resilience

While overall mitigation effectiveness (as captured by !"#$!,! ) is important, in some
instances the “quickness of recovery” (time to start of mitigation after a disruption) and
the “level of recovery” (amount of SoS performance recovered by the mitigation) can be
valued differently. There may also be cases where time or performance is non-linear. For
example, if providing even poor alternative transportation modes during rush hour may
be better than waiting for better modes. Chapter 6 discusses potential ways to address it
in future work.
4.4.3

Outcome of Phase 3

The outcome of Phase 3 is two-fold: (1) a ranking of the impacts of different disruptions
given the availability of mitigation measures, and (2) a resilience map. To explain the
two outcomes, we return to the simple illustrative example described earlier (see Figure
4.3) . Let us now consider three mitigation strategies that the SoS, in its current
configuration, employs (refer to Figure 4.19):
1. When the Bus is disrupted, a backup Bus is deployed, till the original bus is
restored (see Figure 4.19(a)).
2. When the Ferry is disrupted, the Subway is able handle some of the spillover
traffic as passengers can walk to the nearest subway station (see Figure 4.19(b)).
3. When the Subway is disrupted, the Bus and the Ferry partially compensate for the
lost performance (see Figure 4.19(c)).
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(a)

SoS Performance

(b)

SoS Performance

Bus is
disrupted

(c)

SoS Performance

Ferry is
disrupted

Subway is
disrupted

8
2

Backup bus provides
recovery

40

Bus and ferry
provide recovery

Subway provides
recovery
Time

Time

Time

Figure 4.19 Resilience curves for illustrative SoS example (numbers in bold indicate
areas for !"#$!,! calculation)
To build the resilience map we first consider the individual !"#$!,! values. The rows in
Figure 4.20 indicate disruptions while the columns indicate mitigation measures. Where
mitigation is possible, the corresponding cells are populated with !"#$!,! values
calculated using eq. (4). Recall that, where mitigation is not possible, the cells are
undefined. Averaging all potential mitigation options across each row provides the mean
!"!"!,! for each disruption. This value is a measure of how well the mitigation
measures have helped reduce disruptive impacts.
The new relative importance of the different systems can now be determined (third
column of Table 4.5). Observe that with the mitigation strategies available in the current
SoS, the Bus has a lower ranking than the Ferry than in the case without mitigation
measures (refer to Table 4.3).
Set$of$Mi)ga)ons$

Set$of$Disrup)ons$

Bus$

Ferry$

Subway$

Bus$
Ferry$
Subway$

Backup$bus$

Bus$and$ferry$

0.02$

avg. SDCI D,M

0.02$
0.07$

0.07$
0.36$

Figure 4.20 !"#$!,! for illustrative SoS example

0.36$
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Table 4.5 !"#$!,! and importance ranking for illustrative example
Disruptio
n (D)

System Disruption Conditional Importance (!"#$!,! )

Importance ranking

Bus

!"#$!"#,!"#$%&!!"# = 0.02

3

Ferry

!"#$!"##$,!"#$%& = 0.07

2

Subway

!"#$!"#$%&,!"#!!"##$ = 0.36

1

While we know the overall importance of the different disruptions, we now need to
determine how resilience to these disruptions can be improved.
In reliability and risk analysis, practitioners frequently specify minimum acceptable
performance levels to assess risk mitigation measures and safety training – if the
performance of a system or subsystem falls below a pre-determined level, immediate
steps must be taken to address this undesirable situation. These minimum acceptable
levels depend on many factors such as regulatory standards, operator workload and
training, system design, and public acceptance.
In a similar vein, here we introduce a decision threshold (!) to assess the importance of
the different systems. The decision threshold is the maximum acceptable !"#$!,! and is
used to generate the resilience map (see Figure 4.21). We describe how this threshold can
be set in Chapter 5. In this example, assuming ! = 0.1 and comparing each !"#$!,! to
this value of ! each cell in the map is allocated a specific color as follows: red when
!"#$!,! > ! and green when !"#$!,! < !. Darker shades of red indicate disruptions
are highly unmitigated, while darker shades of green indicate disruptions that are
currently handled well.
The resilience map summarizes the relevant resilience information in two ways: (1) high
level overview of which disruptions have been mitigated adequately and which ones have
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not, and (2) detailed information about which disruption-mitigation combinations need
attention.
At the high-level, by comparing the first and last columns of the resilience map, we see
which disruptions have been mitigated (when!!"#! value is red and the corresponding
average !"#$!,! is green), and which ones have not (when !"#! and average !"#$!,!
are both red). The extent to which the strategies mitigate the disruptive impacts is
proportional to the difference between these two values in each row. For ease of
explanation we do not include a discussion of average !"#$!,! here (design implications
of these values will described in Chapter 5).
Next, we study the resilience map in detail to determine potential design changes that can
aid resilience improvement. Section 3.2.1 presented a set of ten design principles that can
be used to drive changes in SoS architecture based on the particular needs of the
particular SoS under study. As mentioned previously, the list is not exhaustive, and as
researchers and practitioners determine new ways to improve SoS designs, this set can be
modified and expanded. Focusing on specific disruption-mitigation pairs, the resilience
map points to different types of improvement strategies. Here we highlight key
suggestions for the illustrative example based on Figure 4.21 (Chapter 5 presents
additional and more interesting design implications through case studies):
1. Observation: The red cell in the last row indicates that disruption of the Subway
has not been adequately mitigated.
Specific problem (a): Both the Bus and the Ferry do not have adequate capacity
to handle the spillover demand.
Potential solution: Physical redundancy can improve the capacity of the
mitigation measures. One way to realize physical redundancy is to maintain spare
ferries and buses, which can be called in to service when there is a Subway
disruption.
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Specific problem (b): High impact (low survivability) of the Subway disruption.
Potential solution: Drift correction can improve the survivability of the Subway.
One way to realize drift correction is to maintain sensors in the subway tunnel to
monitor water levels and thereby control water pumps automatically – this
technique allows some subway lines to continue operating through minor floods.
Note: In a more general sense, the use of different colors to highlight nuances
within SoS resilience is useful because it allows decision-makers to not only
consider the most important systems (obtained from the earlier ranking process)
but also visualize, in an intuitive way, specific areas of inadequate resilience
within the SoS. Thus, the map enables decision-makers to consider multiple
opportunities to improve SoS resilience, such as, for example, the ability to make
minor improvements to several moderately important systems rather than focus
only on the most important one.
2. Observation: While the backup Bus is clearly quite effective in mitigating the
impact of a Bus disruption, it remains unused when the Subway is disrupted.
Opportunity: We could potentially use the backup Bus more effectively by
deploying it in the event of disruptions (e.g.: Subway disruptions) other than the
one it is intended to address (e.g.: Bus disruption).
Note: These types of observations from the resilience map help decision-makers
move away from the stovepipe approach of considering each mode individually
(e.g.: spare buses to be used when primary buses encounter mechanical failures)
and instead identify resources that can be used across different modes.
3. Observation: Cells shaded grey indicate those that mitigations that do not
currently contribute to SoS resilience. For instance, when the Ferry is disrupted,
the Bus does not provide mitigation.
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Suggested improvement: The resilience map highlights the lack of mitigation for
particular disruptions. If the !"#s corresponding to the grey cells are sufficiently
low (first column of the map), the grey cells can be left as is (in other words,
although the disruption is not mitigated, it is small and does not require
mitigation). However, if the !"# and !"#$ is high, the !"# should be lowered by
reducing the impact of the unmitigated disruption, or the !"#$ should be lowered
by adding mitigations. Potential mitigations can be identified by considering the
columns in the map. For instance, by providing shuttle service for passengers
from the Ferry landing to the Bus depot, we can leverage the Bus to mitigate a
Ferry disruption.
Note: While this suggestion may seem obvious, the true value of this
recommendation is realized when the resilience framework is used to study larger
networks (as will be highlighted in Chapter 5). For these SoSs, the visual nature
of the resilience map provides a useful way to summarize those disruptions that
remain unmitigated and those mitigation strategies that do not contribute to
resilience.
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Figure 4.21 Resilience Map for ! = 0.1
The value of ! can range between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates the the SoS is disruption
proof while 1 indicates that the SoS is un-resilient. Determining a suitable!! depends on
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multiple factors such as the particular SoS under investigation, available resources, cost
of the mitigation measures, and the decision-maker’s judgment. Additionally, in practice,
due to the same factors, the value of ! may need to be varied during the decision-making
process. Thus, here, we propose an iterative approach to determining an appropriate !
value (discussed further in Chapter 5 through the use of case studies). Potential ways to
determine an initial value include considering the minimum acceptable performance level
for an SoS (e.g.: average delay in a transportation network should not exceed 45 min),
historical data (e.g.: delays experienced in the National Air Space during previous
disruptions such as snowstorms and hurricanes), and expert opinion.
Varying ! changes the resilience map. While the overall SIM values do not change, the
color of each cell changes as ! varies. For instance, Figure 4.22 and Figure 4.23 show
how the resilience map for the illustrative example changes for ! = 0.4 and ! = 0.05
respectively. Observe that for the higher ! value (risk-taking analyst), all the cells are
some shade of green, indicating that no “areas of concern” exist. In contrast, for the lower
! value (risk averse analyst), some cells that were previously colored green have now
turned red. So, in terms of practical usefulness, an analyst can study how colors on the
resilience map change as the value of alpha “slides” between high and low values. By
identifying the cells that remain red across a range of alpha values, the analyst can
determine mitigation strategies that need to be improved (prioritize resource allocation)
or studied in further detail (guidance for simulations and field tests).
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Figure 4.22 Resilience Map for ! = 0.4
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Figure 4.23 Resilience Map for ! = 0.05

4.5

Improve SoS Resilience (Phase 4)

In Phase 4 of the resilience framework, the potential design improvements suggested in
Phase 3 are implemented and the SIM analysis is conducted again. The updated resilience
map indicates whether (or not) the design changes have yielded the desired results. The
obvious next step in a design process is the evaluation of suitable design changes. While
conducting a suitable analysis of alternatives is beyond the scope of this thesis, this step
will be part of future work of this research. To conduct a comprehensive analysis of
alternatives, several factors must be considered. For example, some questions that should
be part of any qualitative or quantitative analysis include:
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•

How much does the design change cost?

•

How effective is the design change?

•

How easy is it to implement the change?

•

Does the change have unintended consequences? (e.g.: new common cause
disruptions, new training/human factors issues)

4.5.1

Outcome of Phase 4

The outcomes of Phase 4 are similar to those of Phase 3, that is (1) a ranking of the
impacts of different disruptions given the availability of mitigation measures, and (2) a
resilience map. Once the design improvements are made and the SoS is re-analyzed, the
system importance ranking and the resilience map are updated to reflect the changes. If
the design modifications are inadequate or impractical (e.g. too expensive, hard to
implement, organizational hurdles), new design principles can be considered and once
again, the resilience map is updated.
Returning to the simple SoS example, Figure 4.21 pointed to inadequate mitigation of the
disruption of the Subway by the combined capabilities of the Bus and the Ferry, and
suggested using the principle of drift correction to improve the design. The updated
resilience map in Figure 4.24 reflects this design improvement (see green cell in the last
row).
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Figure 4.24 Updated Resilience Map (for ! = 0.1)
4.6

Summary

As described in Section 1.2, the characteristics of systems-of-systems make analysis and
design of resilience challenging. However, these features also offer opportunities to make
SoSs resilient using unconventional methods. In this chapter, we adapted the traditional
risk-based design process to include two SoS-focused features. First, system importance
measures (SIMs) determine the relative importance of different systems based on their
impacts on SoS-level performance. Second, suggestions for resilience improvement draw
from design options that leverage SoS-specific characteristics, such as the ability to adapt
quickly (such as add new systems or re-task existing ones) and to provide partial recovery
of performance in the aftermath of a disruption.
The four phases of the design process can be used to study the resilience of both existing
(fielded) SoSs and new (un-deployed) SoSs. In the case of the former, the resilience map
highlights how well or how badly the current SoS structure can handle disruptions and
points to inadequacies that need to be addressed. For the latter type of SoS, resilience
map helps evaluate the resilience of potential SoS architectures.
Specific advantages of the SIM-based resilience design include:
•

Allows rapid understanding of different areas of concern within the SoS. The
visual nature of the resilience map (a key outcome of the SIM analysis) provides a
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useful way to summarize the current resilience of the SoS as well as point to key
systems of concern.
•

Provides a structured approach to resilience management. Using the design
framework, decision-makers are guided through the analysis of SoS resilience in a
systematic way, starting from the identification of disruptions to iterating in a
group setting to improve SoS resilience.

•

Provides a platform for multiple analysts and decision-makers to study, modify,
discuss and document options for SoS.

In the next chapter, we demonstrate the applicability of the resilience framework to realworld SoSs through the use of two case studies.
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CHAPTER 5. APPLICATION OF SIM-BASED RESILIENCE DESIGN:
DEMONSTRATION STUDIES

In this chapter, we use two case studies to demonstrate how the SIM-based design
framework can be used to inform decision-making in the context of SoS resilience.
The first case study is a naval warfare SoS and illustrates the application of SIMs to
military missions, while the second case study focuses on an urban transportation SoS.
The two SoSs have different objectives and different characteristics. These features
enable us to show how the SIM-based approach is applicable to different types of SoSs
and to highlight major aspects and results of the design process. For instance, while the
primary focus of the urban transportation SoS is the efficient movement of people, the
objectives of time-sensitive military missions can vary widely, such as search-and-rescue,
surveillance, or target elimination. Also, transportation SoSs typically have longer
operational lifetimes, with new systems being interfaced with legacy systems, than
combat SoSs. Consequently, both SoSs face different types of disruptions. As will be
discussed in this chapter, the abovementioned characteristics have implications for
defining SoS performance and determining how the various design principles can be
implemented to improve resilience.
We use each case study to draw attention to different aspects of the resilience framework.
In the naval warfare case study, we describe how the resilience framework can leverage
existing simulation models to support end-to-end design. We proceed through the four
phases of the approach using an agent-based model (ABM) that enables us to
demonstrate how simulation tools and analytical models can be used to determine the
necessary inputs for the framework and subsequently, to inform decision-making
regarding SoS resilience
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The urban transportation case study in contrast focuses on interpreting the results of the
resilience framework and on describing how they can be used to guide design choices in
large infrastructure networks. We use different resilience maps to highlight the range of
design-related information that can be obtained from the framework
5.1

Case Study 1: Naval Warfare SoS

The mission of the naval warfare system-of-systems studied here is to conduct near-shore
search-and-destroy operations, similar to those carried out by the Coast Guard and littoral
combat units in the Navy. Figure 5.1 illustrates the area of interest and the systems in the
SoS. The specific task of the SoS is to find and destroy the enemy boat within the
planned mission time (PMT) of 4 hours. There are four systems in the SoS that
collaborate to achieve the overall objective: a Ship, a Helicopter, an Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV), and a Satellite. The capabilities of each system and the communication
links between them are described in Table 5.1.

Helicopter%

Enemy%
Satellite%

Ship%
UAV%

Figure 5.1 Naval warfare SoS
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Table 5.1 Systems in naval warfare SoS
System

Capabilities

Communication links

Ship

Detect enemy (radar)
Eliminate enemy (weapons)

Send to and receive information from Helicopter
and UAV
Receive information from Satellite

Helicopter

Detect enemy (radar)
Eliminate enemy (weapons)

Send to and receive information from Ship

UAV

Detect enemy

Send to and receive information from Ship

Satellite

Detect enemy

Send information to Ship

We use an agent-based model (ABM) (adapted from Mour et al. [2013]) to simulate and
study the naval warfare SoS. Parameters such as weapons range, velocity, fuel tank
capacities, and radar detection ranges for each agent can be varied to simulate different
recovery options. In the following sections, we proceed through the four phases of the
SIM-based approach and illustrate how the proposed framework facilitates decisionmaking in the context of the naval warfare SoS.
5.1.1

Phase 1: Identify Potential Disruptions

Military missions can encounter many types of disruptions. For example, systems may be
disrupted by enemy attacks, internal subsystem failures, or even adverse weather. Partial
disruptions are also possible, such as, for instance, a disruption of intra-SoS
communications due to electronic jamming.
In this case study, we investigate three types of disruptions: single system disruptions
(due to targeted enemy attacks or random failures), multi-system disruptions (due to
common cause failures and/or cascading failures), and partial disruptions (see Figure 5.2).
In total fourteen disruptions are studied (11 full disruptions and 3 partial disruptions).
Since only the Ship and Helicopter carry weapons and given that mission success
depends on the ability to eliminate the enemy boat, any disruption that has both these
systems failing is not considered in this study. In these cases, we assume that the mission
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is aborted. Additionally, we consider partial disruptions of the Ship and Helicopter. The
Ship has two important functions in the mission: (1) collect, integrate, and distribute
information to the other systems and (2) eliminate the enemy boat using weapons. Hence,
we consider two partial disruptions of the Ship: (1) failure of the communications
subsystem on the ship rendering it unable to co-ordinate with the other systems and, (2)
inability of the Ship to launch its weapons. Similarly, partial disruption of the Helicopter
is a weapons failure.
Given these example disruptions, the agent-based model can demonstrate how well the
SoS performs in the face of these disturbances (described in Phase 2). If however, the aim
were to study the overall effect of a range of disruptions, then we would need to consider
the probabilities that these disruptions occur. Chapter 6 discusses ways to incorporate
uncertainties into the SIM analysis.

Disrup'ons*

Single'system,disrup1ons,

Mul1'system,disrup1ons,

Satellite,
UAV,
Ship,
Helicopter,

Two'system,disrup1ons:,
• Satellite,and,UAV,
• Satellite,and,Ship,
• Satellite,and,Helicopter,
• UAV,and,Ship,
• UAV,and,Helicopter,
,
Three'system,disrup1ons:,
• Satellite,,UAV,,and,Ship,
• Satellite,,UAV,,and,Helicopter,

•
•
•
•

Par1al,disrup1ons,
•
•
•

Communica1ons,failure,on,Ship,
Failure,of,propulsion,subsystem,
on,Ship,
Inability,to,launch,weapons,on,
Helicopter,

Figure 5.2 Potential disruptions in naval warfare SoS

5.1.2

Phase 2: Estimate Impacts of Disruptions

When assessing the performance of military missions, primary parameters of interest are:
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1. Mission success: Will the mission be successful in carrying out its objectives
within the planned mission time?
2. Mission completion time: How soon can the mission be completed?
In this study, to illustrate the application and outcomes of the design process, we focus on
mission success (elimination of the enemy boat within the planned mission time) as a
measure of the SoS performance.
To account for uncertainty and randomness in agent behavior, a Monte Carlo analysis
was conducted 1000 times for each SoS instance (e.g. SoS with no disruptions, SoS with
disrupted UAV, SoS with disrupted UAV and Ship, etc.). Subsequently, the mission
success was calculated as shown below:

!"##"$%!!"##$!! =

!". !"!!"##$!!%"&!!"##"$%#
!
1000

(6)

To establish nominal SoS performance, we ran the ABM without any disruptions and
recorded the resulting mission success (94%).
Next, we determined the impact of the various disruptions identified in Phase 1. For time
critical missions, the time at which a disruption occurs can have a significant impact on
the performance. For instance, a disruption to the satellite late in the mission would have
limited impact if the satellite had already detected the enemy and relayed the relevant
information to other systems before being disrupted. Here, we looked at the potential
disruptions and evaluated their impacts when they happen relatively early in the mission
(at 1 hour) or late in the mission (at 2.5 hours). Table 5.2 summarizes the results. On
average, and as expected, when disruptions happen early, they have a greater impact on
the SoS performance than when they occur late in the mission. Exceptions are when
either the Helicopter or communications on board the Ship are disrupted at 2.5 hours.
Hence, through the rest of this chapter, we consider only early disruptions.
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In this phase of the analysis, we assume that, in the event of a disruption, the remaining
systems continue with the mission and that the disrupted system(s) return to base, that is,
failed systems cannot be repaired or restored within the planned mission time.
Table 5.2 Impact of disruptions on mission success rates (naval warfare SoS)
Mission Success Rate (%)

Type of
disruptions

Single
system
disruptions

Two-system
disruptions

Threesystem
disruptions

Partial
disruptions

Disruption (D)

Early disruption
(at 1 hour)

Late disruption
(at 2.5 hours)

Satellite

27

94

UAV

93

94

Helicopter

3

2

Ship

0

92

Satellite and UAV

1

94

Satellite and Helicopter

0

4

Satellite and Ship

0

93

UAV and Ship

0

94

Helicopter and UAV

0

2

Satellite, UAV, and Helicopter

0

1

Satellite, UAV, and Ship

0

93

Communications subsystem on Ship

1

4

Propulsion subsystem on Ship

92

90

Failure to fire weapons on Helicopter

9

9

From Table 5.2, it is clear that in the worst case, the mission success falls to zero. We
now use this result to determine the worst-case SoS impact as follows: subtract the worstcase mission success rate (0%) from the nominal SoS performance (94%), and then
multiply the resulting number by the duration of the disruption (4 hours, since in the
worst case the disruptions can occur at the start of the mission). The process is shown in
eq. (7).

Worst!case%SoS%impact = 94 − 0 ∙ 4 = 376!!"#$%!

(7)
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Next, the !"#$%&! and !"#! of each disruption are determined using eqs. (2) and (3).
Table 5.3 presents the fourteen disruptions sorted in order from most to least important
based on their !"#! values. Some interesting observations include:
•

Eleven unmitigated disruptions have fairly severe effects (!"#! > 0.6) on the
mission when they occur. Most of these disruptions include either the Ship or the
Helicopter (fairly obvious since these are the only two systems that can carry
weapons.

•

The two types of partial disruptions of the ship have dramatically different
impacts on the SoS. When the propulsion subsystem fails, rendering the ship
immobile but still able to communicate with the other agents, the mission is not
jeopardized (!"#! = 0.02). However, a communications failure (!"#! = 0.75)
can stymie the mission even if the ship can proceed towards the enemy. This
result is intuitive since the SoS configuration (see Table 5.1) shows that the ship
is the central communications hub, and any failure of its communications
capabilities implies that important tracking information does not get delivered to
the other systems.

•

Disruption of the UAV alone has little impact on the SoS mission. However,
when both the UAV and the Satellite are disrupted, the combined impact on the
SoS is larger than their individual impacts. Clearly, while the UAV alone may be
redundant in the un-disrupted SoS, it contributes to surveillance when the Satellite
is disrupted.
Table 5.3 SDI! for naval warfare SoS
!"#!

Importance Ranking

Ship

0.75

1

Satellite and Ship

0.75

1

UAV and Ship

0.75

1

Satellite and Helicopter

0.75

1

Helicopter and UAV

0.75

1

Satellite, UAV, and Helicopter

0.75

1

Disruption (D)
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Disruption (D)

!"#!

Importance Ranking

Satellite, UAV, and Ship

0.75

1

Communications subsystem on
Ship

0.75

1

Satellite and UAV

0.74

9

Helicopter

0.71

10

Failure to fire weapons on
Helicopter

0.68

11

Satellite

0.54

12

Propulsion subsystem on Ship

0.02

13

UAV

0.01

14

5.1.3

Phase 3: Determine Current SoS Resilience

While military personnel will have access to information regarding mitigation measures
(recovery features, contingency plans, operating procedures) of military missions, we
assume that the baseline SoS has three mitigations available to deal with disruptions:
1. The Ship is armed with additional higher-range weapons to compensate for an
Helicopter disruption.
2. The UAV is equipped with a more powerful secondary radar (Mode 2 radar) to
provide wide-area search capability when the Satellite is disrupted. This measure
results in a heavier UAV that requires frequent returns to the Ship for refueling.
3. If the UAV is disrupted, it can be repaired within a certain time frame, here 1.5
hours after the disruption. The UAV would need to return to the Ship for
inspection, repair, and re-deployment.
Again, we used the agent-based model to implement the above mitigations and evaluate
their effectiveness. Next, we recorded the new mission successes to determine !"!"!,!
values using eq. (4) (see Figure 5.3) and !"#$!,! values using eq. (5) (see Figure 5.4).
The rows in both figures indicate disruptions while the columns represent mitigation
strategies. Where mitigation is possible, the corresponding cells are populated with the
calculated !"#$!,! and !"#$!,! values.
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Now, we define a decision threshold (!) and use these !"#$!,! and !"#$!,! results to
build the resilience map.
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Figure 5.4 SDMI!,! (Phase 3) for naval warfare SoS
To determine an initial decision threshold we first establish a minimum acceptable
mission success level. In practice, such a limit can be reached through analysis and
consensus across a range of stakeholders such as among others commanding officers and
combat operations specialists. Here, we assume that the minimum acceptable mission
success is 60% if one or more systems are disrupted early (one hour into the mission).
Now, using eq. (4), we see that the !"#$!,! corresponding to this minimum acceptable
mission success rate is 0.27. Thus, the initial ! is set to 0.27.

91
Next, we develop the resilience map for the naval warfare SoS (see Figure 5.5). As before,
the first column in the map represents impact of unmitigated disruptions (!"#! ), while
the last column denotes the impacts of the same disruptions once they have been
mitigated (average !"#$!,! ). The color of each cell in the resilience map is determined
by comparing its !"#$!,! value with !. At first glance, we note that in some cases the
recovery strategies are adequate (green cells) while in most other cases the strategies are
inadequate (red cells). Closer inspection yields the following observations:
•

Comparing the first and last columns of the map we notice that on disruption,
Satellite, is adequately mitigated (average !"#$!,! < !).

•

Six disruptions have been inadequately managed (average !"#$!,! > ! and
average !"#$!,! < !"#! )

•

The strategies have no effect on one disruption, disruption of Satellite, UAV, and
Helicopter.

•

The strategies do not address six disruptions (rows with all grey cells). However,
two of these disruptions (disruption of the UAV alone and of the Ship’s
propulsion system) originally had very little impact on the SoS, as seen by their
!"#! values, and hence need not be targeted for resilience improvement.

•

The last row in the resilience map provides a summary of the mitigation
effectiveness of each strategy (average !"#$!,! ). The higher this value, the
greater the contribution of the mitigation to SoS resilience. Note that repairing the
UAV and using better weapons on the Ship have relatively minor mitigation
impacts.

Now, how does the resilience map guide decision-making in the context of the naval
warfare SoS? Before we answer this question, we first attempt to determine if changing
the value of ! allows us to focus on a smaller set of red cells to make design
improvements rather than considering all ten of them.
Recall that each red cell in the map indicates inadequate resilience. Instead of
immediately considering all ten red cells, we vary ! to determine how sensitive the colors
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in the map are to the risk the decisions maker is willing to accept. This step allows us to
prioritize resilience improvement strategies – cells that remain red across a range of !
must be addressed first. Returning to the definition of !, we now consider a lower
minimum acceptable mission success rate, 50%. Correspondingly, ! = 0.35. Figure 5.6
shows the resilience map for this new value of !. Unfortunately, varying the decision
threshold has not aided the design process – while two cells have turned a lighter shade of
red, many of the previously bright red cells remain unchanged.
To guide decision-making we return to Figure 5.5 and list key observations, describe the
problems or opportunities they indicate, and point to potential design principles (refer to
Table 3.3) to address them.
1. Observation: Red cells in column “Better weapons on Ship” indicate that the
corresponding disruptions are not adequately mitigated.
Specific problem: The mitigation measures (i.e., weapons on the Ship) have
insufficient range to eliminate threats in the event of an Helicopter disruption.
Potential solution: Physical redundancy can improve the capacity of the
mitigation measures. One way to realize physical redundancy is to maintain a
backup Helicopter on the periphery of the mission that can be deployed as
necessary.
2. Observation: The grey cells in average !"#$!,! column indicates that none of
the mitigation measures address four disruptions all of which involve a disruption
of the Ship’s communication system.
Specific problem: The remaining systems are unable to communicate with each
other, meaning any mitigation measures cannot be accessed due to lack of
communication capabilities.
Potential solutions: Inter-node interaction can increase communication links
between systems. Some ways to realize this principle include:
•

Provide capability for Helicopter to receive information directly from the
Satellite if the Ship is disrupted. Resources needed to implement this
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recovery feature include increased bandwidth allocation and modifications
to communication ports.
•

If the Ship is disrupted, provide capability for UAV to receive information
directly from the Satellite and in turn for the Helicopter to communicate
with the UAV. Resources needed to implement this recovery feature
include

increased

bandwidth

allocation

and

modifications

communication ports.
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5.1.4

Phase 4: Improve SoS Resilience

By using the agent-based model to implement the design suggestions from Phase 3, we
obtain the new resilience map (see Figure 5.7). On the one hand, clearly the design
instances of the inter-node interaction principle are quite effective at mitigating the
disruptions of the Ship’s communication systems. On the other hand, the backup
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Helicopter is no better at addressing the Helicopter disruption than incorporating
advanced (better) weapons on the Ship.
From this new map, we conclude that the most pressing disruptive impact that needs to be
addressed is the disruption of the Helicopter. Potential suggestions include:
•

Improve weapons on Ship: increase the range and/or accuracy of the weapons.

•

Improve back-up Helicopter: use a faster helicopter or perhaps even a different
one.

Two interesting observations arise from considering the last row (average !"#$!,!
values) in the resilience map. First, we can pinpoint those mitigations that contribute
significantly to overall resilience, that is, measures with a high average value, and
subsequently ensure that these mitigations are available and ready to be deployed when
needed. Second, by focusing on those measures that have high average !"#$!,! values,
we propose that one way to improve resilience is to combine some or all these highlyeffective mitigations so that the resulting “super-set” mitigation strategy is effective
across a range of disruptions.
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Figure 5.7 Phase 4 Resilience Map for naval warfare SoS (! = 0.27)3

5.1.5

Summary of Case Study 1

The SIM-based resilience design approach has application to the evaluations of military
SoS, as evidenced by the naval warfare case study. Apart from the specific results
highlighted in the previous section, broader findings of the case study include:
1. SIM-based design provides a structured approach to resilience management.
Using the design framework, decision-makers are guided through the analysis of
SoS resilience in a systematic way, starting from the identification of disruptions
to iterating in a group setting to improve SoS resilience.
2. Resilience map presents both high-level and detailed information about SoS
resilience. The SIM values as well as color–coded elements within the map
3

Caveat: All times of recovery are relatively conservative and have been chosen to highlight the impact of late recoveries on the SoS.
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present specific visual guidance on where the SoS is lacking resilience and where
resilience is adequate.

5.2

Case Study 2: Urban transportation SoS

Infrastructure SoSs such as water, power, and transportation provide important services
to urban populations. Disruptions of these services have serious consequences for public
safety and mobility. For example, Hurricane Sandy impacted electric, communications,
and transportation services in New York City for several days in 2012 [NYC, 2013].
While studies have called for an integrated approach to manage the resilience of the
nation’s critical infrastructure networks, (e.g., NIPP [2006] and PPD [2013]), a recent
GAO assessment [GAO, 2014] of the various resilience assessment tools and models
used by sub-agencies and contractors of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
highlights drawbacks of current approaches. For instance, the report states that at present
DHS is “not well positioned to integrate relevant assessments to identify priorities for
protective and support measures”. Also, there is a lack of guidance in terms of ensuring
that “the areas that DHS deems most important are captured in [these] assessment tools
and methods”. In other work, Righi et al. [2015] emphasize that to advance the state of
resilience engineering, researchers and practitioners need practical guidance on how
“descriptions” of resilience can be translated into “prescriptions”. Clearly a key gap in
managing resilience is the lack of a structured way to bring together information from
different resilience assessment tools and to subsequently motivate resource allocation.
We argue that the SIM-based design framework provides a step in this direction.
To highlight how the proposed approach can be used to obtain meaningful information
and guide decision-making, we provide a partial resilience assessment of Boston’s urban
transportation network. As mentioned previously, the purpose of this case study is to
illustrate the usefulness of the information that can be gleaned from the results of the
resilience framework. We provide a brief discussion on methods that can be used to
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determine the relevant inputs (resilience curves and potential disruptions), and then offer
a detailed description of the design guidance obtained from the resilience maps.
5.2.1

Determining Potential Disruptions and their Impacts

The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) oversees the fifth largest mass
transit system in the United States. To provide service within the city, the Authority
maintains the following modes of transportation: (1) rapid transit using heavy rail, light
rail, and streetcars, (2) commuter rail (typically connecting the city center to the suburbs)
using locomotives and coaches, (3) bus service, and (4) commuter boat that provides
ferry rides between various points in inner Boston harbor. Figure 5.8 provides an
overview of the urban transportation network in Boston.
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Figure 5.8 Overview of Boston Urban Transportation SoS [MBTA, 2014a]
Different types of instigating events can disrupt transportation services in a city. For
instance, instigating events can be organization-related (e.g. strikes by bus drivers and
ticket takers), weather-related (e.g. snowstorms and hurricanes), due to mechanical
failures (e.g. power loss and brake failures), or terrorist attacks. These events can cause a
wide range of disruptions. For example, a mechanical failure may only impact one bus or
one train, while a snowstorm can ground multiple modes of transportation.
The task of identifying potential disruptions can be carried out by a team of analysts and
using relevant methods such as brainstorming in a group setting and by leveraging
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historical data (e.g. age of vehicles, maintenance data, weather information, policy
changes) to determine a list of potential disruptions.
Next, for an urban transportation network, there are several ways to assess the impacts of
unmitigated and mitigated disruptions. Examples include simulation software, analytical
models, and statistical estimation techniques. Most authorities that oversee the transit
services either have in-house tools that are used to carry out various studies regarding
network level metrics such as on-time performance and average delays, or have such
evaluations carried out by consultants (e.g. RAILSIM software [SYSTRA, 2014]).
Additionally, transportation related research has resulted in models that specifically
simulate urban transit services (see for example, Balakrishna et al. [2008] and
Koutsopoulos and Wang [2007]) Similar to our use of the agent-based model in the
previous case study, these simulation tools and analytical models can be directly
leveraged to assess the impacts of different disruptions.
A popular metric of interest to quantify SoS level performance in urban transportation
networks is unlinked passenger ridership, that is, the number of passengers who board
public transportation vehicles [MBTA, 2014b]. Passengers are counted each time they
board vehicles irrespective of the number of vehicles they use to travel from their origin
to their destination. Table 5.4 summarizes typical passenger ridership on weekdays as
published by the MBTA [2014b].

Table 5.4 Typical weekday ridership in 2013 on the select modes of transportation in
Boston [MBTA, 2014]
Mode

Subway

Bus

Line

Typical Weekday Ridership

Red Line

272,684

Orange Line

203,406

Blue Line

63,225

Green Line

227,645

Silver Line

29,839

Trackless Trolley

11,588
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Mode

Line

Typical Weekday Ridership

Bus
Commuter Boat

5.2.2

Ferry

346,388
4439

Reading the Resilience Map

In this section, we discuss pertinent information that can be obtained from resilience
maps of the Boston urban transportation network. Assuming we have determined the
values of the SIMs using the equations presented in Chapter 4, we then use example
resilience maps to indicate how resilience-related design improvements can be made.
First, a note about determining an initial decision threshold for urban transportation
networks. In these SoSs, ! can be specified as the product of two parameters: (1)
minimum acceptable SoS performance level, and (2) maximum acceptable time to
mitigation. These parameters can be estimated as follows:
1. The first parameter is driven by the specific measure used to evaluate SoS
performance. For example, if the SoS performance is measured as passenger
ridership, the decision-maker can specify a minimum acceptable level of ridership
that the SoS needs to satisfy in the event of a disruption.
2. The second parameter can be estimated in different ways based on stakeholder
preferences. For example, one approach is to study historical data and determine
how long, on average, are passengers willing to wait after a disruption (see, for
example, Kaufman et al. [2012]).
Figure 5.9 shows a partial resilience map with some subset of the total disruptions and a
subset of potential mitigation measures. This map explores the state of SoS resilience
when certain modes or lines of transportation are disrupted and how well the remaining
transit services handle the spillover ridership. We assume here that the SoS here does not
provide any explicit means (e.g., shuttle buses) to transport stranded passengers to other
links. Hence, the only factors driving the effectiveness of the mitigation strategies are
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proximity to the disrupted line and ability of alternate modes to handle the extra
passenger traffic.
For example, when the Orange Line (south) is disrupted, three alternate modes of transit
(Silver Line, buses in Zone 3, and the commuter rail in Zone 3) are able to partially
mitigate the impact. The commuter rail is quite effective in handling spillover traffic from
the Orange Line (as indicated by the dark green cell) since it runs parallel to the disrupted
line and has several stations collocated with those of the Orange Line. Thus, the
passengers who intended to travel on the disrupted Orange line have relatively easy
access to an alternate mode of transportation. However, the other two mitigation modes
of transport (Silver Line and the bus service in Zone 3) are less effective in mitigating the
impact of the disrupted subway line as (1) they do not run the length of the Orange Line
and hence do not serve the same locations, meaning passengers would be delayed or
inconvenienced with respect to getting to their final locations, and/or (2) they do not have
sufficient capacity to handle the extra demand from the Orange Line.
How does the resilience map guide decision-making in the context of the urban
transportation SoS? We list key observations, describe the problems or opportunities they
indicate, and point to potential design principles (refer to Table 3.3) to address them.
1. Observation: Average !"#$!,! values in red indicate that the corresponding
disruptions are not adequately mitigated.
Specific problem (a): The mitigation measures (i.e., alternate transportation
modes) have insufficient capacity to handle the spillover demand.
Potential solutions: Physical redundancy and functional redundancy can
improve the capacity of the mitigation measures.
•

One way to realize physical redundancy is to maintain spare subways and
buses, which can be called in to service when there is a disruption on the
respective lines.

•

Functional redundancy for disrupted subway lines can be realized by using
“bus bridges” [Kepaptsoglou and Karlaftis, 2009]. Bus bridges provide
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short-term bus routes between rail (subway or commuter) stations in the
event of a disruption. Buses can be mobilized from depots (spare buses) or
retracted from existing routes to establish the bus bridges.
An opportunity that arises from considering both principles (physical and
functional redundancy) is the ability to combine mitigations across multiple
transportation modes. For instance, investment in spare buses (a relatively
cheaper option than investing in spare trains) is useful to address bus disruptions
(deploy the spare bus when a primary bus is disrupted – physical redundancy) as
well as rail disruptions (deploy spare buses to establish bus bridges between
subway stations – functional redundancy).
Specific problem (b): Passengers have limited access to these alternate modes.
Potential solutions:
•

Inter-node interaction can improve access to the mitigation measures. This
principle can be realized by providing shuttle services to the nearest
alternate mode of transportation (e.g., from the disrupted subway stations
to the nearest bus or commuter rail facilities). Another method to increase
inter-node interaction is to improve bicycle infrastructure. Suitably located
bicycle stations can allow some passengers to cycle to the nearest alternate
mode.

•

Improved communication at the organizational level can improve access
to the mitigation measures. Well-established emergency plans that clearly
facilitate timely and effective sharing of information between regulatory
authorities, operators, and passengers can help minimize performance
impacts on the transportation network. Thus, passengers can be evacuated
safely and re-directed to other modes of transport efficiently.

2. Observation: The presence of red and green cells in columns Commuter Rail
Zone 1 and Commuter Rail Zone 2 indicate that commuter rail services in both
these zones provide adequate mitigations in some instances and inadequate
mitigation in other instances. For example, the commuter rail line in Zone 2
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provides effective partial recovery when the Orange Line (North) is disrupted but
not when the Blue Line is disrupted.
Specific problem: The alternate modes are unable to provide adequate mitigation
because passengers have limited access to them.
Potential solutions: Inter-node interaction can improve access to the mitigation
measures.
•

One way to realize this principle in Zone 1 is to maintain bus stops within
walking distance of commuter stations. However, making this change
would require a redesign of existing bus routes so that the stops are colocated with rail stations. A relatively cheaper option is to provide shuttle
services between bus stops and the commuter rail stations. However, this
option needs pre-planning in terms of personnel co-ordination and the
availability of shuttles to be deployed in a timely manner.

•

The principle of inter-node interaction can be realized in Zone 2 by colocating subway and rail stations. In fact, this design is already seen on the
Orange Line (North) where several transfer facilities are provided between
commuter rail service and subway stations. Such a provision allows
passengers to switch modes relatively easily. Again, since this might be a
challenging change to make in the SoS design (extensive structural and
procedural modifications of the transit services are required), operating
shuttle buses between the stations of the two modes may be a more costeffective option.

3. Observation: The presence of multiple red cells in column Ferry indicates that
this service contributes inadequately to mitigating the impacts of multiple
disruptions.
Specific problem: While it seems that this mode can be leveraged to mitigate
disruptive impacts across several (more than three) adverse events, the passenger
capacity of the Ferry service is insufficient.
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Potential solution: Physical redundancy can improve the passenger ridership
capacity of the mitigation measures. One way to realize this principle in this
instance is to maintain spare ferries, which are called in to service when there is a
disruption. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy in New York, an
extra ferry was introduced between Manhattan and Staten Island to compensate
for the railway disruption [Kaufman et al., 2012].
4. Observation: Commuter rail in Zone 1 can mitigate disruption of the Green Line
(B), while the Green Line (B) mitigates the disruption Red Line (North).
Opportunity: It may be possible to improve the SoS design such that Commuter
Rail in Zone 1 can be leveraged to mitigate a Red Line (North) disruption.
Potential solution: Inter-node interaction can facilitate movement of passengers
from the Red Line to the Commuter Rail. As before, timely shuttle services can
provide the required transfer capabilities between the disrupted subway and
mitigating rail modes.
5. Observation: The grey cell in average !"#$!,! column indicates that none of the
mitigation measures address the disruption of Green Line (D).
Specific problem: Passengers affected by the disruption are unable to access
alternate transit modes.
Suggested improvement: The resilience map does not point to specific
improvements. The decision-maker needs to carefully study the reasons for the
current inability to mitigate this disruption and identify potential mitigation
measures.
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Figure 5.9 Example Resilience Map (partial) for Boston urban transportation SoS
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Figure 5.10 shows another example of a partial resilience map for the Boston urban
transportation SoS. This map reflects a more resilient SoS with better mitigation
measures that have been realized, for example, by implementing the functional
redundancy and inter-node interaction suggestions from the previous discussion. Now,
how does this resilience map guide decision-making for the SoS? As before, we list key
observations, and then point to potential design principles to address them. However,
here, we do not discuss implications of red cells in the map. These cells can be
interpreted in a similar fashion as the previous resilience map. Instead, we focus on the
green cells and describe the opportunities they suggest for resilience improvement.
1. Observation: The presence of light green cells in the mitigation columns for bus
service (Zones 1, 2, and 3) and commuter rail (Zones 1, 2, and 3) indicate that
these two modes are reasonably well equipped to provide mitigation when
disruptions occur.
Opportunity: While many of the cells are light green, there is room for further
improvement (that is, to make them dark green), ensuring even better mitigation
of the disruptions. However it may be the case that we have reached maximum
feasible effectiveness in terms of additional capacity to carry passengers and
providing passengers with access to these alternate modes. In such situations, one
way to improve the resilience further is to focus on delaying or reducing the
impact of the disruption.
Potential solutions: System-level properties and drift correction can improve the
capacity of the mitigation measures.
•

One way to leverage system-level properties is to improve the robustness
of the subway design by either deploying inflatable flood barriers in
subway tunnels or constructing raised entrances at flood-prone stations.
Another technique, with a focus on road design, is to upgrade pavements
using materials that can withstand extreme weather. This improvement
allows continued bus service during winter weather storms.

•

One way to realize drift-correction is to deploy sensors in subway tunnels
to detect rising water levels and automatically activate water pumps. Thus,
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pre-emptive initiation of mitigation allows subway services to continue for
a longer duration of time before being halted than would otherwise be
possible.
2. Observation: When considered together, the bus service (Bus Zone 1, Bus Zone
2, and Bus Zone 3) and commuter rail (Commuter Rail Zone 1, Commuter Rail
Zone 2, and Commuter Rail Zone 3) are able to adequately mitigate all the
disruptions in identified set.
Opportunity: A useful next step would be to assess what minimum combination of these
six mitigation strategies could be the most effective. For instance, the bus service and
commuter rail in Zone 3 sufficiently address the same disruptions. Decision-makers can
now explore if either of these can be downgraded slightly in order to allocate resources to
transportation facilities in other zones..
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Figure 5.10 Example Resilience Map (partial) for Boston urban transportation SoS
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5.2.3

Summary of Case Study 2

The resilience framework has application in resilience management of infrastructure
networks such as urban transportation. The design framework provides transit authorities
with a systematic approach to evaluating SoS resilience and determining suitable
improvements.
Results of a recent survey of 48 international transit agencies [Pender et al., 2013]
concluded that many of these organizations do not have adequate parallel transportation
networks in the event of subway disruptions. In addition, it was observed that the primary
focus of existing mitigation measures is to provide crossover tracks that facilitate the
quick removal of the disrupted vehicles and thereby allow spare trains to provide service.
While there is consideration of using multiple mitigation alternatives, these measures are
typically determined in an ad-hoc manner based on immediate needs of the SoS. For
example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, the MTA implemented a system of “bus
bridges” from Brooklyn to Manhattan designed as a substitute for subway lines that cross
the East River. However, since at first the operation of these buses was not streamlined,
long waits (more than an hour) were reported for subway shuttle buses in Brooklyn
[Kaufman et al., 2012]. If instead, the use of these shuttle buses was planned for as part
of emergency transportation procedures, it is likely that the operations would have been
executed with less delay for the traveling public.
In summary, the SIM-based resilience design can contribute to the development of
organizational and contingency plans in the event of disruptions. The resilience map, in
particular, helps identify un-resilient modes and point to ways to address them.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Systems-of-systems are ubiquitous and here to stay. The services provided by SoSs are
typically vital and time-sensitive. It is therefore essential that these networks be made
resilient to adverse events. This thesis revolves around the issues of managing resilience
in systems-of-systems. A comprehensive treatment of the topic should address the
following three questions:
1. What is resilience in the context of an SoS and when is it appropriate?
•

How can resilience be distinguished from other system-level attributes?

2. How can resilience be designed?
•

What level of resilience is desirable and how resilient is the SoS currently?

•

What principles can be applied to achieve resilience in SoS design?

3. How can resilience be maintained over the SoS lifetime?
•

When does resilience change?

•

How can adverse impacts of changing resilience be observed and mitigated?

In this research, we addressed questions 1 and 2. First, we reviewed the concept of
resilience as discussed in various domains, and then provided a comparison with related
engineering attributes such as reliability, robustness, and flexibility. We argue that
characterizing the purpose of the different attributes and in some cases disentangling the
definition of resilience from related system-level attributes is useful in enriching overall
SoS design.
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Next, we focused on the second question: how can SoS resilience be designed? Methods,
tools, and processes that can be applied to designing resilient SoSs were categorized and
discussed. We observed that while traditional risk and reliability tools have use in
assessing resilience, their application has limitations. Instead recent multi-disciplinary
research that has made significant strides in modeling and evaluating SoSs can be
leveraged more effectively to answer the question. Based on this review, we concluded
that the biggest gap is in providing design guidance for resilience and that there exists a
need to facilitate informed decision-making at the SoS level.
This thesis has developed an aid to design that provides specific guidance on where and
how resources need to be targeted. Specifically, we adapted the traditional risk-based
design process to include two SoS-focused features. First, system importance measures
(SIMs) determine the relative importance of different systems based on their impacts on
SoS-level performance. Second, suggestions for resilience improvement draw from
design options that leverage SoS-specific characteristics, such as the ability to adapt
quickly (such as add new systems or re-task existing ones) and to provide partial recovery
of performance in the aftermath of a disruption.
More broadly, the design process:
•

Allows rapid understanding of different areas of concern within the SoS. The
visual nature of the resilience map (a key outcome of the SIM analysis) provides a
useful way to summarize the current resilience of the SoS as well as point to key
systems of concern.

•

Provides a structured approach to resilience management. Using the design
framework, decision-makers are guided through the analysis of SoS resilience in a
systematic way, starting from the identification of disruptions to iterating in a
group setting to improve SoS resilience.

•

Provides a platform for multiple analysts and decision-makers to study, modify,
discuss and document options for SoS.
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6.1

Recommendations for Future Work

The SIM-based design approach presented in this thesis is one step towards formalizing
the resilience design process. The following areas provide promising topics for future
work.
6.1.1

Value of Design Improvements

While the resilience framework allows us to determine potential design improvements,
the next step is to conduct a suitable analysis of alternatives. One way is to use the SIMs
to evaluate the benefit of potential improvements in a traditional cost-benefit analysis.
For instance, we can incorporate the marginal cost of implementing a particular
mitigation by dividing each system importance measure by the corresponding cost
associated with it. Such a SIM/cost metric would allow us to compare different mitigation
strategies and determine which ones provide the most mitigation effectiveness for the
least cost.
6.1.2

Non-linearity of Performance and Time

The System Importance Measures presented in Chapter 4 assume a linear importance of
performance over the course of some time frame. However, this linearity may not always
be observed – the performance drop may become less significant as time passes. For
instance, as mentioned previously, in some cases providing even poor alternative
transportation modes during rush hour may be better than waiting for better modes.
One avenue to address this issue is by using a family of nonlinear functions to represent
the temporal and performance level importance of SoS performance.
6.1.3

Broader Application of the Resilience Design Process

The SIMs are domain-agnostic and have a generic formulation based on performance and
time. These features permit wider application of the SIMs, for instance, at the system
level. Here, while the SIMs can be used to evaluate system resilience, the principles and
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design choices that drive resilience improvement are system-dependent. Hence, while the
resilience design process remains the same, how the design is done is based on systemlevel considerations.
6.1.4

Uncertainties and Complex Effects

The SIMs presented in this thesis are calculated assuming that a disruption does occur
and that the mitigation measure is available to provide temporary recovery. However, in
many cases, these two assumptions may not hold and so in this section we discuss how
some uncertainties and complex effects can be factored in to the system importance
measures.
Expected System Importance Measures (SIMs)
Here, we consider two aspects of uncertainty: the uncertainty regarding the occurrence of
a disruption and the availability of a mitigation measure:
1. Uncertainty in disruptions. The same instigating event can result in different
disruptions. For example, moderate snowfall in Atlanta has a higher likelihood of
disrupting Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport (ATL) while Chicago
O’Hare International Airport (ORD) is reasonably well equipped to handle the
same level of snowfall. The likelihood of being adversely affected is not only a
function of the disruptive event itself but also of the available resources
(infrastructure, emergency personnel, organizational flexibility).
2. Availability of mitigation measure. In some situations, mitigation strategies may
not be available. For example, a blizzard can impact two airports in a particular
metroplex, rendering both unable to handle diverted flights (a mitigation measure
which would otherwise have been possible if one airport was disrupted by a
hostile attack while the other was not).
To account for the above factors we develop the expected System Importance Measures.
Now, we can express the outcomes of an instigating event as a decision tree (see Figure
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6.1). There are three possible outcomes: the “nominal curve” (refer to Figure 4.8), the
“disruption curve” (refer to Figure 4.10), and the “resilience curve” (refer to Figure 4.16).
Recall that !"#! measures the disruption curve, while !"#$!,! and !"#$!,! represent
the resilience curve. Also, ! is a disruption and ! is a mitigation measure.

OUTCOME'
Mi$ga$on'

Resilience(curve(

Disrup$on'
No'Mi$ga$on'

Disrup1on(curve(

Ins$ga$ng'event'

No'Disrup$on'

Nominal(curve(

Figure 6.1 Event tree for expected SIMs
Now, referring to the “resilience curve” outcome in the decision tree, the expected value
of !"#$!,! can be expressed by eq. (8):
! !"#$!,! = !"#$!,! ∙ !(!) ∙ !(!|!)

(8)

Where !(!) is the probability that the disruption D occurs and !(!|!) is the probability
that the mitigation measure is unavailable given D has occurred
Expanding the conditional probability and if ! ! > 0, we obtain eq. (9).

!(!|!) =

!(!! ∩ !)
!(!!)

Substituting eq. (9) in eq. (8), the expected value reduces to eq. (10).

(9)
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! !"#$!,! = !"#$!,! ∙ !(! ∩ !)

(10)

Now, if ! and ! are independent events then ! ! ∩ ! = !(!) ∙ !(!). Thus, the
expected !"#$!,! can be expressed as eq. (11).
! !"#$!,! = !"#$!,! ∙ !(!) ∙ !(!)

(11)

In many instances, the above equation is reasonable. For example, disruption of subway
service in New York City due to flooding of rail tunnels most likely will not affect the
ability of extra bus service to compensate for the rail. SoS engineers can use either
historical data to determine the disruption and mitigation probabilities, or model them as
random variables using appropriate distributions. However, when ! and ! are not
mutually independent, such as in the case of common cause disruptions (a single
instigating event causes the disruption of multiple systems) and cascading disruptions
(disruption of one system adversely impacts other systems), careful consideration needs
to be made to determine the join probability!!(! ∩ !).
Similar to !(!"#$!,! ), the expected !"#$!,! can be determined as shown in eq. (12):
! !"#$!,! = !"#$!,! ∙ !(!) ∙ !(! ∩ !)

(12)

Again, when ! and ! are independent events, eq. (12) reduces to eq. (13):
! !"#$!,! = !"#$!,! ∙ !(!) ∙ !(!)

(13)

Returning to the resilience design process, if the relevant probabilities are available or
can be estimated, Phases 3 and 4 can be carried out using these expected SIMs as before
to determine the expected resilience maps.
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6.2

Further Considerations for Research in Resilience based on SoS Characteristics

In this thesis, we presented one approach to facilitating decision making in the context of
SoS resilience. However, there are several other avenues to advance the state of resilience
research. Here we use the characteristics of SoSs to identify design questions and suggest
potential research directions, as summarized in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Key questions in designing resilient SoSs
SoS characteristic

Specific design questions
•

Large-scale with
heterogeneous systems

Uncertainties in SoS
evolution and operating
environment

Multiple stakeholders
and/or partial control
of SoS

6.2.1

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

How can sufficiently detailed models be developed that do not oversimplify the problem?
How can models capture cross-domain coupling effectively?
How can the computational challenges associated with large models
be dealt with efficiently?
How can internal and external uncertainties be modeled?
Where should resilience be added?
Will there be any unintended consequences of resilience improvement
measures?
What is an acceptable or suitable level of resilience for a particular
SoS?
How can we develop strategies that incentivize and facilitate
resilience improvement measures for the overall SoS in a climate of
uneven distribution of costs and benefits, and uncertain realization of
benefits?

SoSs are typically large-scale networks that consist of a variety of heterogeneous
systems

The ability of SoSs to provide capabilities that single systems cannot stems from their
inherent diversity, that is, the variety of their constituent systems (heterogeneous nature
of SoSs) and, in many cases, the geographical distribution of these systems (large-scale
feature of SoSs). While these characteristics are essential to achieving SoS goals, they
present challenges that can stymie efforts to effectively analyze SoSs, particularly with
respect to modeling SoS resilience. These issues include modeling the interactions within
and between SoSs, and computational challenges associated with large models.
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All complex systems pose a modeling challenge, which essentially comes down to
determining what the minimum level of fidelity is that will still provide useful results
(and whether this fidelity is computationally tractable). This problem is especially tough
in the case of SoSs, where even low-fidelity models can rapidly become very large and
hence computationally challenging and difficulty to verify and validate. Several
researchers have been addressing this problem by modeling SoSs as networks, which
enables them to leverage network theory. But this approach requires that nodes be
identical, or that only a few types of nodes be considered. Other work has extended
modeling and measurement efforts to include performance levels of heterogeneous nodes
rather than just flows between nodes in a network. However, most of these studies tend to
be infrastructure-specific, and hence have limited use. Given the above discussion (see
also Section 3.2), it is fair to ask:
How can we develop sufficiently detailed models to analyze SoS resilience?
The first set of research questions relates to developing models of adequate fidelity to
analyze SoS resilience. Specifically: (1) How can we develop sufficiently detailed models
that do not over-simplify the problem? (2) How we can we efficiently capture crossdomain coupling? and (3) How do we deal with computational challenges associated with
large models? Answers to these questions will provide useful contributions to the SoS
engineering community. Some routes to solving these questions are:
•

Use pattern recognition to model evolution of SoS operations. One promising
approach is to leverage advances in “Big Data” tools and techniques to the
analysis of resilience in SoSs. This method has been used effectively in weather
prediction and modeling. Computer software is used to identify previous weather
patterns that closely resemble the current conditions, and then the predicted
outcome is based on some weighted combination of the previous, similar,
outcomes. Similarly, exploring response patterns of existing SoSs to previous
disruptions could be used to evaluate new architectures. For example, Kalawsky
et al. [2013] use pattern recognition to model emergency response (SoS
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comprising police departments, fire brigades, and ambulance services) for a major
incident in the UK.
•

Use cloud-based computing to facilitate the development of large SoS models.
Some advantages of using this approach include: (1) the ability to separately
develop various aspects of the larger model (co-locating simulations and
resources is no longer a constraint), and (2) the ability to involve multiple,
distributed contributors and expertise simultaneously (researchers need not
“reinvent the wheel”: existing models can be used and built upon remotely).

•

Use Meta-models that consider multiple models, multiple experts, and shared
variables and parameters to represent and analyze SoSs. For example,
consider the case of a rise in sea level due to climate change and its impact on
saltwater intrusion into coastal groundwater aquifer systems. Haimes [2012]
describes three system models to analyze this phenomenon: hydrological (water
modeling), agricultural-social (impacts on agriculture and domestic water
supplies), and regional economic models (economic impacts). All three models
draw inputs from the same database (here, external climatological models). In
other work, Filippini and Silva [2015] present a modeling language (I®ML) to
facilitate analysis of interdependencies with the aim to improve SoS (in particular,
critical infrastructure) resilience. The authors also provide a discussion of other
useful models, such as the functional resonance analysis model [Hollnagel, 2012]
and an interdependency model based on failures and repairs [Johansson and
Hassel, 2010]. Carley [2003] presents the concept of Dynamic Network Analysis
to evaluate network evolution and change propagation in large-scale, dynamic
networks; this approach provides fertile ground for the development of SoSfocused meta-models.

•

Leverage Human-System Integration research to improve SoS design and
accessibility for human operators. As SoSs continue to grow in size and
complexity, the integration of humans with software and systems becomes
increasingly significant. Currently, human capabilities and limitations and their
implications on the design, deployment, operation, and maintenance of SoSs are

120
typically not explicitly addressed in SoS engineering and acquisition lifecycles
[Madni, 2010]. This challenge can be addressed by incorporating human-system
integration (HSI) ideas such as cognitive compatibility, identification of HSI
patterns, and human performance modeling. For example, one specific ongoing
project [Rouse, 2012] explicitly models human behavior and performance as part
of a larger effort to improve the application of systems engineering to SoSs.
•

Develop metrics for the price of uncertainty to provide guidance in
establishing modeling requirements. Apart from building SoS resilience models,
a key challenge is evaluating the models themselves. Specifically, what level of
model fidelity can provide the required quality of guidance to decision-makers?
One way to answer this question is through the development of suitable metrics
and methods that help assess this price of uncertainty.

6.2.2

SoSs operate in environments of high degrees of uncertainty

Traditionally, system optimization has sought to identify the “best” point design given a
fixed set of constraints for the entire lifetime of the system. However, in the case of longlasting SoSs, such as infrastructure and transportation networks, this approach of
deterministic optimization over a single period cannot be solved in a permanent sense.
The key hurdle to identifying an optimal solution is the uncertain environment, both
endogenous (internal) and exogenous (external), in which SoSs typically operate.
Endogenous uncertainty includes SoS evolution in terms of phasing out of old systems,
inclusion of new systems, upgrades to existing systems, and changes to the underlying
communication (cyber). Exogenous uncertainty is driven by changes in the external
environment, such as new types of threats, new requirements to interface with other SoSs,
and changing stakeholder needs. Further, this uncertainty ranges from the well-defined
(e.g., we know that Boston will most likely experience several blizzards every winter), to
the much more difficult “unknown-unknowns”. So, the second set of research challenges
stem from the following question:

121
Given the uncertainties in hazards, technologies, and SoS structure, how can we make
SoSs optimally resilient?
The uncertainties mentioned above have a significant impact on modeling and managing
SoS resilience. Specific questions that decision-makers need to address include: (1) How
can internal and external uncertainties be modeled? (2) Will there be any unintended
consequences of resilience improvement measures? and (3) What is an acceptable or
suitable level of resilience for a particular SoS? An SoS that is optimally resilient now to
a certain class of threats may not be optimally resilient in the future as its constituent
systems and the external threats change in time (there is also the question of what
“optimally resilient” means). For example, in recent years airports have been made more
resilient to terrorist attacks (through improved screening and emergency response
procedures). However, as global-warming induced changes affect weather patterns, these
airports may not be resilient to blizzards and rainstorms that may occur with higher
frequency in the future. Also, specifically with respect to infrastructure SoSs, engineers
and designers seldom have the opportunity to design an SoS “from scratch” – these SoSs
typically evolve over many decades as systems are acquired, upgraded, and/or removed.
And so a fourth question arises: is it possible to upgrade a formerly un-resilient SoS into
a resilient one?
Addressing unforeseen changes is a challenging task primarily because identifying
“unknown unknowns” by definition is impossible. However, while we do not always
know why or how systems and processes might be disrupted, we can improve
anticipation and recovery efforts through improved SoS modeling. For example, tools
that facilitate the analysis of multi-system failures are valuable in directing resilience
improvement resources. Similarly, as it is likely that different systems will come back
online at different times (e.g., refer to previous example of impact of different rate of
recovery of aviation and rail transportation in New York city in the aftermath of
Hurricane Sandy), such tools would be useful to mitigate the harmful impact of
asynchronous recoveries.
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These situations highlight the need for discussions about the acceptable level of resilience
an SoS needs to maintain and over what range of scenarios this resilience should be
available. Another factor that has significant implications for managing resilience under
uncertainty is the inherently multi-dimensional aspect of resilience: performance and time.
As a result, in many cases decisions about resilience improvement must consider where
the resilience should be placed, that is, following a disruption, should we improve the
performance considerably albeit after a significant downtime or should we ensure a
timely recovery with minimum performance recovery?
We believe that the abovementioned challenges offer opportunities to “creatively” tackle
the issue of SoS resilience, and here, suggest a few ways to approach this thorny
challenge:
•

Identify “resilience pathways” that allow an SoS to remain resilient over long
time periods. As threats and the constituent systems of the SoS evolve
stochastically over the lifetime of the SoS, the necessary optimization must put
the SoS on a “path to resilience”, that is, it must allow for incremental changes
that can maintain resilience of the SoS over time.

•

Use the concept of multiple equilibria from ecology to design engineering
resilience. As the interdependencies between SoSs, and not just between their
constituent systems, grow, the concept of multiple equilibria from ecology (ability
of a system to move into a different equilibrium or stable state to maintain
functionality in the face of a disruption [Holling, 1973]) could provide an
interesting approach to developing resilient SoSs. For example, can we design
transportation networks that allow demand to be shifted over and sustained on the
bus networks in the event of a major railway disturbance, thereby shifting the
“equilibrium” from rail to road? These studies would need to also take into
account social behavior and preference patterns of the general public, further
strengthening the idea that multiple disciplines as widely diverse as engineering
and psychology, for example, would need to be corralled to analyze SoS
resilience in its entirety [Jackson, 2007].
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6.2.3

SoS operations involve multiple stakeholders and in many cases partial control
over the SoS

The constituent systems in most civilian SoSs, such as infrastructure and transportation
networks, are typically owned and operated by different entities and/or organizations.
Similarly, in the military domain, although SoSs exhibit a defined structure with respect
to their operations, a variety of stakeholders are involved in the development of the
constituent systems. Hence, attempts to improve the resilience of SoSs may result in
situations where some stakeholders are required to accept greater costs. The following
question drives the third set of research challenges:
How can we develop strategies that incentivize and facilitate resilience improvement
measures for the overall SoS in a climate of uneven distribution of costs and benefits,
and uncertain realization of benefits?
Since the human element is a significant part of the development, operation, and
maintenance of resilient SoSs addressing the above question can improve discussions
about resilience improvement strategies. Some suggestions are provided below:
•

Develop tools to support decision-making and information exchange between
stakeholders. From a technological perspective, better decision-making tools that
support stakeholder collaboration efforts are needed to improve the quality of
resilience-related discussions. These tools can be developed by adopting recent
advances in fields such as collaboration technology, information abstraction,
visual analytics, and data sharing [Provan and Kenis, 2008; Neches and Madni,
2012]. Additionally, existing frameworks such as DoDAF [DoD, 2010] and the
Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF) [Open Group, 2011] can be
leveraged to facilitate SoS visualization and communication between analysts and
stakeholders.

•

Improve stakeholder risk perception through the development of risk
communication tools. For the overall SoS to be made resilient, some fraction of
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the constituent systems must include features to mitigate effects of disruptions.
This uneven spread of resilience requirements implies a disproportionate spread
of stakeholder benefits and costs. Further, the value of a particular resilience
strategy is only realized when the disruptions or failures actually occur. As a
result, improved risk communication tools need to be developed (as highlighted in
Aven [2013b]) to improve risk perception and to help stakeholders make
decisions.
•

Develop common standards to facilitate SoS development. Just as common
standards enable the concurrent but separate development of subsystems (e.g.,
testing standards ensure that all subsystems meet minimum electromagnetic
compatibility requirements), common standards may enable multiple stakeholders
to work together more effectively to develop systems-of-systems. Obvious
standards include selecting SI or English units—however, could more
sophisticated standards be helpful? For example, would using the System
Modeling Language (SML) contribute to faster or otherwise more effective
development? Similarly, do the lessons and benefits of concurrent engineering
transfer to SoS level engineering?

•

Develop strategies to minimize cost-benefit imbalances to stakeholders.
Resilience improvement measures at the SoS-level can result in an uneven
distribution of costs and benefits across stakeholders, which may make some
reluctant to participate. Given these potential imbalances, new approaches are
needed to determine which strategies are most appropriate to persuading
stakeholders to make the necessary changes or upgrades to their systems. For
example, Marais and Weigel [2006] present a framework to encourage successful
technology transition in civil aviation. Specifically, the authors use cost, benefit,
and value distributions across stakeholders and over time to determine which
strategies are most appropriate to persuading aircraft operators to adopt new
equipage. Specific strategies could include phased implementation of resilience
improvement measures, positive incentives such as monetary benefits or tax
breaks to early participants, and mandates and punitive approaches.

125

LIST OF REFERENCES

125

LIST OF REFERENCES

Abbott, R. (2006). Open at the Top; Open at the Bottom; and Continually (but Slowly)
Evolving. IEEE International Conference on System of Systems Engineering. Los
Angeles, CA.
Albert, D. S. and Hayes, R. E. (2003). Power to the edge. DOD Command and Control
Research Program (CCRP). URL: http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_Power.pdf.
Accessed March 01, 2014.
Alessandri, A. and Filippini, R. (2013). Evaluation of Resilience of Interconnected
Systems Based on Stability Analysis. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Vol.7722.
pp:180-190.
Attoh-Okine, N., Cooper, A. T., and Mensah, S. A. (2009). Formulation of resilience
index of urban infrastructure using belief functions. IEEE Systems Journal. Vol. 3(2), pp:
147- 153.
Ash, J. and Newth, D. (2007). Optimizing Complex Networks for Resilience Against
Cascading Failures. Physical Review A. Vol. 380. pp: 673–683.
Aven, T. (2013a). Practical implications of the new risk perspectives. Reliability
Engineering and System Safety. Vol. 115. pp: 136-145.
Aven, T. (2013b). On How to Deal with Deep Uncertainties in a Risk Assessment and
Management Context. Risk Analysis. Vol. 33(12). pp: 2082-2091.
Ayyub, B. (2014). Systems Resilience for Multihazard Environments: Definition, Metrics,
and Valuation for Decision-Making. Risk Analysis. Vol. 34(2). pp 340-355.
Balakrishna, R., Wen, Y., Ben-Akiva, M., and Antoniou, C. (2008). Simulation-Based
Framework for Transportation Network Management in Emergencies. Transportation
Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board. Vol. 2041(1). pp: 8088.
Barabási, A-L. and Albert, R. (1999). Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science.
Vol. 286. pp: 509-512.

126
Barker, K., Ramirez-Marquez, J. E., and Rocco, C. M. (2013). Resilience-Based Network
Component Importance Measures. Reliability Engineering & System Safety. Vol. 117. pp
89-97.
Barker, K. and Baroud, H. (2014). Proportional hazards model of infrastructure system
recovery. Reliability Engineering and System Safety. Vol. 124. pp: 201-206.
Barkhorn, E. (2014). Map: ‘How Much Snow It Typically Takes to Cancel School in the
U.S’. The Atlantic. URL: http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/01/maphow-much-snow-it-typically-takes-to-cancel-school-in-the-us/283470/. Accessed March
26, 2015.
Barot, V., Henshaw, M, Siemieniuch, C., Sinclair, M, Lim, S. L., Henson, S., Jamshidi,
M., and DeLaurentis, D. (2013). SoA Report. Trans-Atlantic Research and Education
Agenda in Systems of Systems (T-AREA-SoS). URL:
https://www.tareasos.eu/docs/pb/SoA_V3.pdf. Accessed March 10, 2014.
Bartelt, D. (1994). On resilience: questions of validity. In Wang, M. and Gordon E. W.
eds. Educational Resilience in Inner-city America: Challenges and Prospects. Lawrence
Erlbaum. Hillsdale, NJ.
Barker, K. and Baroud, H. (2014). Proportional hazards model of infrastructure system
recovery. Reliability Engineering and System Safety. Vol. 124. pp: 201-206.
Ben-Haim, Y. (2012). Why risk analysis is difficult, and some thoughts on how to
proceed. Risk Analysis. Vol. 32(10). pp: 1638-1646.
Bowen, J. and Stavridou, V. (1993). Safety-critical systems, formal methods and
standards. Software Engineering. Vol. 8(4). pp:189-209.
Brown, R. and Drew, C. (2012). Airlines Begin a Laborious Comeback. New York Times
(October 31) . URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/01/business/after-hurricanesandy-returning-to-the-air.html?pagewanted=all. Accessed January 09, 2014.
Bruneau, M., Chang, S., Eguchi, R., Lee, G., O’Rourke, T., Reinhorn, A., Shinozuka, M.,
Tierney, K., Wallace, W., and von Winterfeldt, D.( 2003). A framework to quantitatively
assess and enhance the seismic resilience of communities. Earthquake Spectra. 19(4), pp:
733–752.
Bruneau, M. and Reinhorn, A. (2004). Seismic resilience of communities—
Conceptualization and operationalization. International Workshop on Performance-based
Seismic Design. Bled, Slovenia. June 28–July 1.
Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E., and Havlin, S. (2010). Catastrophic
Cascade of Failures in Interdependent Networks. Nature. Vol. 464. pp: 1025–1028.

127
Carley, K. M. (2003). Dynamic network analysis. Dynamic Social Network Modeling and
Analysis:Workshop Summary and Papers. pp:133-145
Castet, J-F. and Saleh, J. H. (2012). On the concept of survivability, with application to
spacecraft and space-based networks. Reliability Engineering and System Safety. Vol. 99.
pp: 123-138.
Castet, J-F. and Saleh, J. H. (2013). Interdependent Multi-Layer Networks: Modeling and
Survivability Analysis with Applications to Space-Based Networks. PLoS ONE. Vol.
8(4).
CBS. (2014). Road to nowhere: Minor snowstorm brings Atlanta to standstill. CBS (29
January). URL: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/atlanta-other-parts-of-south-paralyzedby-ice-snowstorm/. Accessed 01 October 2014.
Chalupnik, M. J., Wynn, D. D., and Clarkson, J. (2013). Comparison of ilities for
protection against uncertainty in system design. Journal of Engineering Design. Vol.
24(12). pp: 814-829.
Chang, S. E., McDaniels, E., Fox, J., Dhariwal, R., and Longstaff, H. (2013). Toward
Disaster-Resilient Cities: Characterizing Resilience of Infrastructure Systems with Expert
Judgments. Risk Analysis. Vol. 34(3). pp 416-434.
Chittister, C. G., and Haimes, Y. Y. (2011). The Role of Modeling in the Resilience of
Cyberinfrastructure Systems and Preparedness for Cyber Intrusions. Journal of
Homeland Security and Emergency Management. Vol. 8 (1).
Clemen, R. T. and Winkler R. L. (1999). Combining Probability Distributions From
Experts in Risk Analysis. Risk Analysis. Vol. 19(2). pp: 187-203.
Cox, L.A. (2012). Confronting deep uncertainties in risk analysis. Risk Analysis.Vol.
32(10). pp: 1607-1629.
Crossley, W.A. (2004). System of Systems: An Introduction of Purdue University
Schools of Engineering's Signature Area. Engineering Systems Symposium at MIT.
Cambridge, MA. March 29-31.
Crucitti, P., Latora, V., and Marchioori, M. (2004). Model for Cascading Failures in
Complex Networks. Physical Review E. Vol. 69(4).
Dahmann, J. and Baldwin, K. (2008). Understanding the Current State of US Defense
Systems of Systems and the Implications for Systems Engineering. IEEE Systems
Conference. Montreal, Canada. April 7-10.

128
Dedman, B. (2011). What are the odds? US nuke plants ranked by quake risk. NBC News.
URL: http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42103936/ns/world_news-asia_pacific/t/what-areodds-us-nuke-plants-ranked-quake-risk/#.UznaFq1dUvd. Accessed March 04, 2014.
DeLaurentis, D., Crossley, W., and Mane, M. (2011). Taxonomy to Guide Systems-ofSystems Decision-Making in Air Transportation Problems. Journal of Aircraft. Vol.
48(3). pp: 760-770.
DoD. (2008). Systems Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems. Version 1.0. URL:
http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/SE-Guide-for-SoS.pdf. Accessed 18 January 2015.
DoD. (2010). The DoDAF Architecture Framework Version 2.02. URL:
http://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/0/Documents/DODAF/DoDAF_v2-02_web.pdf.
Accessed 21 January 2015.
DoD. (2011). Department of Defense Science and Technology Emphasis Areas. URL:
http://www.acq.osd.mil/chieftechnologist/publications/docs/OSD%2002073-11.pdf.
Accessed 22 January 2015.
Dove, R. (2001). Response Ability—The Language, Structure, and Culture of the Agile
Enterprise. Wiley. New York.
Dunjo, J., Fthenakis, V., Vilchez, J. A., and Arnaldos, J. (2010). Hazard and operability
(HAZOP) analysis. A literature Review. Journal of Hazardous Materials. Vol. 19(32). pp:
19-32.
Elsayed, E. (1996). Reliability Engineering. Addison Wesley Longman Inc.
Feynman, R. (1986). Personal observations on Reliability of Shuttle. In NASA Rogers
Commission Report - Appendix F. URL: http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v2appf.htm.
Accessed March 03, 2014.
Filippini, R. and Silva, A. (2013). A modeling framework for the resilience analysis of
networked systems-of-systems based on functional dependencies. Reliability Engineering
and System Safety. Vol. 125. pp: 82-91.
Filippini, R. and Silva, A. (2015). I®ML: An Infrastructure Resilience-Oriented
Modeling Language. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems. Vol.
45 (1). pp: 157-169.
Fleming, C. H., Spencer, M. Thomas, J., Leveson, N., Wilkinson, C. (2013). Safety
assurance in NextGen and complex transportation systems. Safety Science. Vol. 55. pp:
173-187.

129
Folke, C. (2006). Resilience: The emergence of a perspective for social–ecological
systems analyses. Global Environmental Change. Vol. 16(3). pp: 253-267.
Francis, R. and Bekera, B. (2014). A metric and frameworks for resilience analysis of
engineered and infrastructure systems. Reliability Engineering and System Safety. Vol.
121. pp: 90-103.
GAO. (2014). Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Action Needed to Enhance
Integration and Coordination of Vulnerability Assessment Efforts. Government
Accountability Office. URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665788.pdf. Accessed March
17, 2015.
Garmezy, N. (1970). Process and reactive schizophrenia: Some conceptions and issues.
Schizophrenia Bulletin. Vol. 1(2). pp: 30–74.
Garvey, P. R. and Pinto, C. A. (2009). Introduction to Functional Dependency Network
Analysis. International Symposium on Engineering Systems. Cambridge, MA. June 15-17.
Giuliano, G., and Golob, J. (1998). Impacts of the Northridge Earthquake on Transit and
Highway Use. Journal of Transportation and Statistics. Vol. 1(2). pp: 1-20.
Goerger, S., Madni., A. M., and Eslinger, O. J. (2014). Engineered Resilient Systems: A
DoD Perspective. Conference on Systems Engineering Research. Redondo Beach, CA.
March 21-22.
Goldman, H.; McQuaid, R.; Picciotto, J. (2011). Cyber resilience for mission assurance.
IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security. Waltham, MA.
November 15-17.
Goodyear, M., Goerdel, H. T., Portillo, S., & Williams, L. (2010). Cybersecurity
management in the states: The emerging role of chief information security officers. IBM
Center for The Business of Government. Washington, D.C.
Gorod and Sauser. (2008). System-of-Systems Engineering Management: A Review of
Modern History and a Path Forward. IEEE Systems Journal. Vol. 2(4). pp: 484-499.
Guarniello, G. and DeLaurentis, D. (2013). Dependency Analysis of System-of-Systems
Operational and Development Networks. Conference on Systems Engineering Research.
Atlanta, GA, March 20-22.
Haimes, Y. Y. (2009). On the definition of resilience in Systems. Risk Analysis. Vol. 29
(4). pp 498-501.

130
Haimes, Y.Y. (2012). Strategic preparedness for recovery from catastrophic risks to
communities and infrastructure systems of systems. Risk Analysis. Vol. 32(11). pp 18341845.
Haimes, Y. Y., Crowther, K., and Horowitz, B. M. (2008). Homeland security
preparedness: Balancing protection with resilience in emergent systems. Systems
Engineering. Vol. 11(4), pp 287-308.
Hamel, G., & Valikangas, L. (2003).The quest for resilience. Harvard Business Review.
Vol. 81. pp: 52–63.
Han, S.Y., Marais, K., and DeLaurentis, D. (2012). Evaluating System of Systems
Resilience using Interdependency Analysis. IEEE International Conference on Systems,
Man, and Cybernetics, Seoul, Korea. October 14-17.
Henry, D. and Ramirez-Marquez, H. (2012). Generic metrics and quantitative approaches
for system resilience as a function of time. Reliability Engineering and System Safety.
Vol. 99. pp: 114-122.
Higgins, A. (2012). Lessons for the U.S. From a Flood-Prone Land. New York Times (14
November). URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/world/europe/netherlands-setsmodelof-flood-prevention.html?pagewanted=all. Accessed 01 October 2014.
Holling, C. S. (1973). Resilience and stability of ecological systems. Annual Review of
Ecology and Systematics, Vol. 4, pp: 1–23.
Holling, C. S. (1996). Engineering resilience versus ecological resilience. In Schulze, P.
ed. Engineering within Ecological Constraints. The National Academies Press.
Washington, D.C.
Hollnagel, E. (2012). FRAM, the functional resonance analysis method modelling
complexsociotechnical systems. Ashgate. Surrey, England
Hollnagel, E., Woods, D. W., and Leveson, N. (2006). Resilience Engineering: Concepts
and Precepts. Ashgate. Burlington, VT.
INCOSE. (2000), Resilient Systems Working Group. URL:
http://www.incose.org/practice/techactivities/wg/rswg/. Accessed 22 January 2015.
Jackson, S. (2007). A multidisciplinary framework for resilience to disasters and
disruptions. Journal of Integrated Design and Process Science. Vol. 11(2). pp: 91-108.
Jackson and Ferris. (2013). Resilience Principles for Engineered Systems. Systems
Engineering. Vol. 16(2). pp: 152-164.

131
Jackson, S. (2010). Accident Avoidance and Survival and Recovery from Disruptions.
Wiley. Hoboken, NJ
Jackson, S. and Ferris, T. L. J. (2013). Resilience Principles for Engineered Systems.
Systems Engineering. Vol. 16(2). pp: 152-164
Jamshidi, M. (2008). System of systems engineering - New challenges for the 21st
century. IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems Magazine. Vol. 23(5). pp: 4-19.
Johansson, J., and Hassel, H. (2010). An approach for modelling interdependent
infrastructures in the context of vulnerability analysis. Reliability Engineering and
System Safety. Vol. 95(12), pp: 1335–1344.
Johansson, J., Hassel, H., and Zio, E. (2013). Reliability and vulnerability analyses of
critical infrastructures: Comparing two approaches in the context of power systems.
Reliability Engineering and System Safety. Vol. 120, pp: 27–38.
Johnson, J. L. and Wielchelt, S. A. (2004). Introduction to the special issue on resilience.
Substance Use and Misuse. Vol. 39(5). pp: 657–670.
Kalawsky, R.S., Joannou, Y. T., and Fayoumi, A. (2013). Using architecture patterns to
architect and analyze systems of systems. Conference on Systems Engineering Research.
Atlanta, GA. 20-22 March.
Kantur, D. and Iseri-Say, A. (2012). Organizational resilience: A conceptual integrative
framework. Journal of Management & Organization. Vol. 18(6), pp: 762–773.
Kaplan, S., & Garrick, B. J. (1981). On the quantitative definition of risk. Risk Analysis,
Vol. 1. pp: 11–28.
Kaplan, S. and Garrick, B. J. (1981). On the quantitative definition of risk. Risk Analysis,
Vol. 1.pp: 11–28.
Kaufman, S., Qing, C., Levenson, N., and Hanson, M. (2012). Transportation During and
After Hurricane Sandy. URL:
http://wagner.nyu.edu/files/rudincenter/sandytransportation.pdf. Accessed March 03,
2015.
Klein, R. J. T., Smit, M. J., Goosen, H., and Hulsbergen, C. H. (1998). Resilience and
vulnerability: coastal dynamics or Dutch dikes. Geographical Journal. Vol. 164(3). pp:
259–268.
Klein, R. J. T, Nicholls, R. J., and Thomalla, F. (2003). Resilience to natural hazards:
How useful is this concept?. Environmental Hazards. Vol. 5. pp: 35–45.

132
Knight, J.C. (2002). Safety critical systems: challenges and directions. Proceedings of the
24th International Conference on Software Engineering. Orlando, FL. 25-25 May.
Koutsopoulos, H. N. and Wang, Z.(007). Simulation of Urban Rail Operations:
Application Framework, Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation
Research Board. pp: 84-91.
Kurant, M. and Thiran, P. (2007). Error and Attack Tolerance of Layered Complex
Networks. Physical Review E. Vol. 76(2).
Laprie, J-C. (2008). From dependability to resilience. IEEE International Conference on
Dependable Systems and Networks. pp: G8–G9.
Lengnick-Hall, C. A. and Beck, T. E. (2003). Beyond bouncing back: The concept of
organizational resilience. Paper presented at the National Academy of Management
meetings. Seattle, WA.
Leveson, N. (1995). Safeware. Addison-Wesely. Boston, MA.
Leveson, N. (2012). Engineering a Safer World. The MIT Press. Cambridge, MA.
Liu, Y-Y., Slotine, J-J., and Barabasi, A-L. (2011). Controllability of complex networks.
Nature. Vol. 473(12). pp: 167–173.
Lopez, D. (2006). Lessons Learned From the Front Lines of the Aerospace. IEEE
International Conference on System of Systems Engineering. Los Angeles, CA.
Luzeaux, D. (2011). Engineering Large-scale complex systems. In Luzeaux, D., Ruault,
J-R., and Wippler, J-L., eds. Complex Systems and Systems-of-Systems Engineering.
Wiley. Somerset, NJ.
Mahnken, G. E. (2001). Use case histories to energize your HAZOP. Chemical
Engineering Progress. Vol. 97(3). pp: 73-78.
Masten, A. S. (1994). Resilience in individual development. Successful adaptation
despite risk and adversity. In Wang, M. C., Gordon, E. W., eds. Educational Resilience in
Inner-City America: Challenges and Prospects. Erlbaum. Hillsdale, NJ. pp: 3–25.
Madni, A. M. (2010). Integrating humans with software and systems: Technical
challenges and a research agenda. Systems Engineering. Vol. 13 (3). pp: 232-245.
Madni., A. M., and Jackson, S. (2009). Towards a Conceptual Framework for Resilience
Engineering. IEEE Systems Journal. Vol. 3(2). pp: 181-191.

133
Maier, M. W. (1998). Architecting Principles for System-of-systems. Journal of Systems
Engineering. Vol. 1(4). pp: 267-284.
Maier, M. W. and Rechtin, E. (2000). The Art of Systems Architecting. CRC Press - Boca
Raton, FL.
Mallak, L. A. (1998). Measuring resilience in health care provider organizations. Health
Manpower Management. Vol. 24(4). pp: 148–152.
Mane, M., Crossley, W. A., and Nusawardhana. (2007). System of Systems Inspired
Aircraft Sizing and Airline Resource Allocation via Decomposition. Journal of Aircraft.
Vol. 44(4). pp: 1222-1235.
Manyena, S. B. (2006). The concept of resilience revisited. Disasters. Vol. 30(4). pp:
434–450.
Marais, K. and Weigel, A. (2006). A Framework to Encourage Successful Technology
Transition in Civil Aviation. 25th Digital Avionics Systems Conference. Portland, OR.
15-19 October.
MBTA. (2014a). Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority: Rapid Transit/Key Bus
Routes Map. URL:
http://www.mbta.com/uploadedfiles/Documents/Schedules_and_Maps/Rapid%20Transit
%20w%20Key%20Bus.pdf. Accessed March 01, 2015.
MBTA. (2014b). Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority: Ridership and Service
Statistics. URL:
http://www.mbta.com/uploadedfiles/documents/2014%20BLUEBOOK%2014th%20Editi
on.pdf Accessed March 01, 2015.
McCarter, B. G. and White, B. E. (2007). Emergence of SoS, Socio-Cognitive Aspects.
In Jamshidi, M. ed. System of Systems Engineering- Principles and Applications. CRC
Press.
Mekdeci, B., Ross, A. M., Rhodes, D. H., and Hastings, D. E. (2012). Controlling
Change within Complex Systems Through Pliability. Third International Engineering
Systems Symposium (CESUN). Delft, Holland. June 18-20.
Miles, S. B. and Chang, S. E. (2006). Modeling community recovery from earthquakes.
Earthquake Spectra. Vol. 22(2). pp: 439 458.
Modarres, M., Kaminsky, M., and Krivtsov, V. (1999). Reliability Engineering and Risk
Analysis: A Practice Guide. Marcel Dekker. New York, NY.

134
Motter, A.E. and Lai, Y-C. (2002). Cascade-Based Attacks on Complex Networks.
Physical Review E. Vol. 66(6).
Neches, R. and Madni, A. M. (2012). Towards affordably adaptable and effective
systems. Systems Engineering. Vol. 16(2). pp: 224-234.
Newman, D. E., Nkei, B., Carreras, B. A., Dobson, I., Lynch, V. E., et al. (2005). Risk
Assessment in Complex Interacting Infrastructure Systems. 38thHawaii International
Conference on System Sciences. Big Island, HI. January 03-06.
NIPP: (2006). National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Department of Homeland Security.
URL: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan_noApps.pdf. Accessed July 20,
2014.
NYC. (2013). Hurricane Sandy after Action: Report and Recommendations to Mayor
Michael R. Bloomberg.
URL:http://www.nyc.gov/html/recovery/downloads/pdf/sandy_aar_5.2.13.pdf. Accessed
March 26, 2015.
Okashah, L.A. and Goldwater, P.M. (1994). Unknown unknowns: modeling
unanticipated events. In Tew, J. D., Manivannan, M. S., Sadowski, D. A., and Seila, A. F.,
eds. Proceedings of the 1994 Winter Simulation Conference. pp: 689-694.
Open Group. (2011). The Open Group Architectural Framework Version 9.1. URL:
http://www.opengroup.org/togaf/. Accessed 21 January 2015.
Ouyang, M., Dueñas-Osorio, L., and Min, X. (2012). A three-stage resilience analysis
framework for urban infrastructure systems. Structural Safety. Vol. 36 (1). pp: 23–31.
Paltrinieri, N., Tugnoli, A., Bonvicini, S., Cozzani, V. (2011). Atypical scenarios
identification by the DyPASI procedure: application to LNG. Chemical Engineering
Transactions. Vol. 24. pp: 1171-1176.
Pant, R., Barker, K., and Zobel, C.W. (2013). Static and Dynamic Metrics of Economic
Resilience for Interdependent Infrastructure and Industry Sectors. Reliability Engineering
and System Safety. Vol. 125. pp: 92-102.
Park, J., Seager, T. P., Rao, P. S. C., Convertino, M., and Linkov, I.. (2013). Integrating
Risk and Resilience Approaches to Catastrophe Management in Engineering Systems.
Risk Analysis. Vol. 33(3). pp: 356-367.
Pearson, I. L. G. (2011). Smart grid cyber security for Europe. Energy Policy. Vol. 39(9).
pp: 5211-5218.

135
Pender, B., Currie, G., Delbosc, A., and Shiwakoti, N. (2013). Disruption recovery in
passenger railways. Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation
Research Board . Vol. 2353(4). pp: 22-32.
PPD. (2013). Presidential Policy Directive: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience.
URL: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policydirective-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil. Accessed January 26, 2015.
Provan, K. G. and Kenis, P. (2008). Modes of network governance: Structure,
management, and effectiveness. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory.
Vol. 18(2). pp: 229-252.
Ramirez-Marquez, J.E. and Coit, D. W. (2007). Multi-state component criticality analysis
for reliability improvement in multi-state systems. Reliability Engineering & System
Safety. Vol. 92(12). pp: 1608-1619.
Rasmussen, N. (1975). Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400), US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, NUREG-75/014.
Rausand, M., and Høyland, A. (2004). System Reliability Theory: Models, Statistical
Methods, and Applications. Wiley – Interscience. Hoboken, NJ.
Reed, D. A., Kapur, K. C., and Christie, R. D. (2009). Methodology for assessing the
resilience of networked infrastructure. IEEE Systems Journal. Vol. 3(2). pp: 174–180.
Renschler, C. S., Frazier, A. E., Arendt, L. A. Cimellaro, G. P., Reinhorn, A. M., and
Bruneau, M. (2010). Developing the ‘PEOPLES’ resilience framework for defining and
measuring disaster resilience at the community scale. 9th US and 10th Canadian
Conference on Earthquake Engineering. Toronto, Canada, July 25-29, 2010.
Resilience Alliance. (2001). URL: http://www.resalliance.org/. Accessed 22 January
2015.
Richards, M.G. (2009). Multi-attribute tradespace exploration for survivability. PhD
Dissertation. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Richards, M. G., Ross, A. M, Shah, N. B., and Hastings, D. E. (2009). Metrics for
Evaluating Survivability in Dynamic Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration. Journal of
Spacecraft and Rockets. Vol. 46(5).
Righi, A. W., Saurin, T. A., and Wachs, P. (2015). A systematic literature review of
resilience engineering: Research areas and a research agenda proposal. Reliability
Engineering & System Safety. doi:10.1016/j.ress.2015.03.007.

136
Rinaldi, S.M. (2004). Modeling and Simulating Critical Infrastructures and Their
Interdependencies. 37th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. Big Island,
HI. January 05-08.
Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J. P., and Kelly, T.K. (2001). Critical Infrastructure
Interdependencies. IEEE Control Systems Magazine. Vol. 21(6). pp: 11-25.
Robinson, B. W. (1995). Application of hazard and operability studies to a wide range of
industries and activities. Quality and Reliability Engineering International. Vol. 11(6).
pp:. 399–402.
Rose, A. (2007). Economic resilience to natural and man-made disasters: multidisciplinary origins and contextual dimensions. Environmental Hazards. Vol. 7(4). pp:
383-398.
Rouse, W. (2012). Multi-Level Socio-Technical Modeling. Systems Engineering
Research Center Project #44 . URL: http://www.sercuarc.org/projects/view/34. Accessed
April 03, 2014.
Ruault, J!R., Vanderhaegen, F., and Luzeaux, D. (2012). Sociotechnical systems
resilience. INCOSE International Symposium. Vol. 22(1). pp:339-354.
Ryan, E. T., Jacques, D. R., and Colombi, J. M. (2013). An Ontological Framework for
Clarifying Flexibiliy-Related Terminology via Literature Survey. Systems Engineering.
Vol. 16(1). pp: 99-109.
Saleh, J. H., Mark, G., and Jordan, N. C. (2009). Flexibility: a multi-disciplinary
literature review and a research agenda for designing flexible engineering systems.
Journal of Engineering Design. Vol. 20(3). pp: 307-323.
Saleh, J. H., Marais, K. B., and Favaró, F. M. (2014). System safety principles: A
multidisciplinary engineering perspective. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process
Industries. Vol. 29. pp: 283-294.
SEI. (2009). Software Engineering Institute – CERT Resiliency Engineering Framework.
Sheard, S. and Mostashari, A. (2008). A Framework for System Resilience Discussions.
18th Annual International Symposium of INCOSE. Utrecht, Netherlands. 15-19 June.
Sheffi, Y. (2007). The Resilient Enterprise: Overcoming Vulnerability for Competitive
Advantage. The MIT Press. Cambridge, MA.
Sheffi, Y. and Rice, J. B. (2005). A supply chain view of the resilient enterprise. MIT
Sloan Management Review. Vol. 47(1).

137
Shinozuka, M., Chang, S. E., Cheng, T-C., Feng, M., O'Rourke, T. D., Saadeghvaziri, M.
A., Dong, X., Jin, X., Wang, Y. and Shi, P. (2004). Resilience of Integrated Power and
Water Systems. In MCEER Research Progress and Accomplishments: 2003-2004 ed.
MCEER). Buffalo, NY. ), pp: 65-86.
Sterbenz, J. P. G., Cetinkaya, E. K., Hameed, M. A., Jabbar, A., and Rohrer, J. P. (2011).
Modelling and Analysis of Network Resilience. International Conference on
Communication Systems and Networks (COMSNETS). Bangalore, India. January.
Storey, N. R. (1996). Safety Critical Computer Systems. Addison-Wesley. Boston, MA.
SYSTRA. (2014). RAILSIM X. URL: http://www.systraconsulting.com/railsimxreg.html. Accessed March 12, 2015.
Thissen, W. A. H., and Herder, P. M. (2008). System of System Perspectives on
Infrastructures. In Jamshidi, M. ed. System of Systems Engineering- Principles and
Applications. CRC Press.
Tierney, K. (2003). Conceptualizing and measuring organizational and community
resilience: Lessons from the emergency response following the September 11, 2001
attack on the World Trade Center. Third Comparative Workshop on Urban Earthquake
Disaster Management. Kobe, Japan.
Tierney, K. and Bruneau, M. (2007). Conceptualizing and Measuring Resilience. TR
News. URL: http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/trnews/trnews250_p14-17.pdf.
Accessed March 01, 2014.
Trucco, P., Cagno, E., and Ambroggi, M. D., (2012). Dynamic functional modeling of
vulnerability and interoperability of Critical Infrastructures. Reliability Engineering and
System Safety. Vol. 105. pp: 51-63.
TTCP. (2014). Recommended Practices: System of Systems Considerations in the
Engineering of Systems. The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) Technical Report.
URL: http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/TTCP-Final-Report-SoS-RecommendedPractices.pdf. Accessed 18 January 2015.
Uday, P., and Marais, K. (2013). Exploiting Stand-In Redundancy to Improve Resilience
in a System-of-Systems (SoS). Conference on Systems Engineering Research. Atlanta,
GA. March 20-22.
Ulieru, M. (2007). Design for resilience of networked critical infrastructures. IEEE
International Conference on Digital Ecosystems and Technologies. Cairns, Australia.
February 21-23.

138
Vaidhyanathan, R. and Venkatasubramianian, V. (1995). Digraph-based models for
automated HAZOP analysis. Reliability Engineering and System Safety. Vol. 33(49). pp:.
33-49.
Van der Borst, M., and Schoonakker, H. (2001). An overview of PSA importance
measures. Reliability Engineering & System Safety. Vol. 72 (3). pp: 241-245.
Van der Leeuw, S.E. and C.A. Leygonie. (2000). A long-term perspective on resilience in
socio-natural systems. Workshop on System Shocks–System Resilience. Abisko, Sweden.
May 22-26.
Weber, P. and Jouffe, L. (2006). Complex system reliability modelling with Dynamic
Object Oriented Bayesian Networks (DOOBN). Reliability Engineering and System
Safety. Vol. 91(2). pp: 149-162.
WEC. (2013). Building Resilience in Supply Chains. World Economic Forum. URL:
http://www.weforum.org/reports/building-resilience-supply-chains. Accessed 01 October
2014.
Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe K. M., and Obstfeld, D. (1999). Organizing for high reliability:
Processes of collective mindfulness. Research in Organizational Behavior. Vol. 21. pp:
81–123.
Werner, E. E. and Smith, R. S. (1977). Kauai’s children come of age. University of
Hawaii Press. Honolulu, HI.
White, B.E. (2006). Fostering Intra-Organizational Communication of Enterprise
Systems Engineering Practices. National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) 9th
Annual Systems Engineering Conference. San Diego, CA. October 23-26.
Whitson, J. C., and Remirez-Marquez, J. E. (2009). Resiliency as a component
importance measure in network reliability. Reliability Engineering and System Safety.
Vol. 94(10). pp: 1685-1693.
Wildavsky, A. (1991). Searching for safety. Transaction Publishers. New Brunswick, NJ.
Wojcik, L.A. and Hoffman, K.C. (2006). Systems of Systems Engineering in the
Enterprise Context: A Unifying Framework for Dynamics. IEEE International
Conference on System of Systems Engineering. Los Angeles, CA.
Wreathall, J. (2006). Property of Resilient Organization: An Initial View. In Hollnagel, E.,
Woods, D. W., and Leveson, N. eds. Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts.
Ashgate. Burlington, VT.

139
Xu, X-L., Qu, Y-Q., Guan, S., Jiang, Y-M., and He, D-R. (2011). Interconnecting Bilayer
Networks. Europhysics Letters. Vol. 93.
Yue, O.C. (2003). Cyber security. Technology in Society. Vol. 25(4). pp: 565-569.
Zhang, W. J., and Lin, Y. (2010). On the principle of design of resilient systems –
application to enterprise information systems. Enterprise Information Systems. Vol. 4(2).
pp: 99-110.
Zhang, W. J., and Lin, Y. (2010). On the principle of design of resilient systems –
application to enterprise information systems. Enterprise Information Systems. Vol. 4(2).
pp:. 99-110.
Zio, E., and Ferrario, E. (2013). A framework for the system-of-systems analysis of the
risk for a safety-critical plant exposed to external events. Reliability Engineering &
System Safety. Vol. 114. pp: 114-125.
Zobel, C. W. (2011). Representing perceived tradeoffs in deﬁning disaster resilience.
Decision Support Systems. Vol. 50(2). pp: 394-403

13

VITA

140

VITA

Payuna Uday completed her schooling in Dubai and holds a Bachelor of Technology in
Electronics and Communication Engineering from the National Institute of Technology
in Trichy, India.
In 2011 Payuna received her master's degree in Aeronautics and Astronautics from
Purdue University, with a focus on assessing the environmental mitigation potential of
operational changes in aviation.
Working in the VRSS (Value through Reliability, Safety, and Sustainability) Lab under
the guidance of Prof. Karen Marais, she has gained experience in systems engineering
and risk assessment of complex socio-technical systems in general and, air transportation
systems in particular.

